Western University

Scholarship@Western
Digitized Theses

Digitized Special Collections

2011

An Explanation of the High Rates of Discrepancies in Letter of
Credit Transactions: the “Bilateral Assurance” Mechanism
Zaid AL-Rizzo

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/digitizedtheses

Recommended Citation
AL-Rizzo, Zaid, "An Explanation of the High Rates of Discrepancies in Letter of Credit Transactions: the
“Bilateral Assurance” Mechanism" (2011). Digitized Theses. 3635.
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/digitizedtheses/3635

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Digitized Special Collections at
Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted for inclusion in Digitized Theses by an authorized administrator of
Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact wlswadmin@uwo.ca.

An Explanation of the High Rates of Discrepancies in Letter of Credit Transactions: the
“Bilateral Assurance” Mechanism

( Spine title: Discrepancies in Letters of Credit Transactions)

(Thesis format: Monograph)

By

Zaid AL-Rizzo

Graduate Program in Law

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Laws

The School of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
The University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario, Canada

© Zaid AL-Rizzo 2011

THE UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO
School of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies

CERTIFICATE OF EXAMINATION

Supervisor

Examiners

Professor Mohamed Khimji

Professor Tom Telfer

Supervisory Committee

Professor Chi Carmody

Professor Tom Telfer

Professor James Hatch

The thesis by

Zaid AL-Rizzo
entitled:
An Explanation of the High Rates of Discrepancies in Letter of Credit Transactions:
the “Bilateral Assurance” Mechanism
is accepted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Laws

Date
Chair of the Thesis Examination Board

Abstract
The high rate of discrepancies in letter of credit transactions, and the waiver of the overwhelming
majority of these discrepancies by applicants, reveal that buyers and sellers are not benefiting
from their primary advantage—legal enforceability. Two hypotheses are proposed in this thesis
to provide a tentative explanation for the phenomena under consideration. First, letters of credit
are an “assured-payment” mechanism—so long as the beneficiary submits conforming
documents, it is legally entitled to payment. Second, letters of credit provide the beneficiary with
a “verification” service—they assure that the applicant is financially solvent. Qualitative and
quantitative researches are employed as the methodological approaches. Specifically, descriptive
research is employed to investigate the underlying theories regarding letters of credit. Empirical
data is utilized to demonstrate both the high-rate of discrepancies and the most common
discrepancies in letter of credit transactions. The findings reveal that both the “assuredpayment” and “verification” theories fail to address why sophisticated commercial parties pay
substantial fees for the issuance of letters of credit and then choose not to take advantage of its
legal enforceability. Accordingly, both hypotheses are rejected. In conclusion, an alternative
hypothesis is developed in this thesis which adopts the “bilateral assurance” mechanism to
address the research question posed. This theory emphasizes informational signaling within the
context of international business transactions. Specifically, the preparation of the bill of lading,
commercial invoice, insurance certificate, packing list, and country of origin are viewed as
concrete actions by which the commercial parties can modify their behavior and legally enforce
their rights.
Keywords: Letters of credit, “Assured payment” explanation, “Verification” service, Standards
of compliance, “bilateral assurance” mechanism.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
I. Motivation
The growing importance of international trade and the associated process of financing
import and export transactions necessitate the development of effective means to manage
international business transactions. A typical international business transaction involves
at least four interrelated contracts.12The first is the underlying sales contract for goods
and/or services. That is, a buyer in one country must agree to buy the goods or services of
the seller in another country. Following the underlying sales contract, the commercial
parties involved must arrange for an agreed upon means of financing, usually through a
bank. The third is the arrangement for the shipment of the goods. Finally, a contract for
insurance must be agreed upon to provide remedy in case the goods are damaged in
. 2
transit.
The objectives of a buyer and seller in an international business transaction are rather
straightforward. The buyer wants to obtain goods from the seller that conform to the
quantity, quality, and description agreed upon between the two parties in the underlying
sales contract. Meanwhile, the seller’s objective is to obtain payment from the buyer. The
commercial parties have a wide variety of financing mechanisms available to them in the
international trade realm. These methods of financing include: cash in advance (pre

1 Daniel Chow & Thomas Schoenbaum, International Business Transactions Problems, Cases, and
Materials (New York City: Aspen Publishers, 2005).
2 Ibid.
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payment), letters of credit, documentary collections, and open accounts.3 Commercial
parties select a particular method of finance based on costs and the allocation of risk.
This thesis examines in detail the use of documentary letters of credit.4 A letter of
credit is an instrument, issued to a seller-beneficiary by an issuer (bank) on the account of
a buyer-applicant, by which the issuer promises to honor a draft or demand for payment
so long as the conditions set forth in the letter are met.5 A study published in 2000
revealed that businesses use letters of credit in approximately one-fifth (20 percent), or
over $200 billion worth, of international business transactions involving the sales of
goods coming into or out of the United States.6
Letters of credit are a popular method of finance because it shifts the risk from the
seller to a bank; which is better equipped to evaluate the risks associated with the buyer.
This instrument is particularly popular in the export industry where risks are very
difficult to assess. It is difficult for sellers to access reliable credit information about
buyers located in a foreign country. Further, the seller may be obliged to deal with
unfamiliar foreign law and country risks which include: balance of payment issues,
exchange controls, and government stability.
The applicant agrees with the issuing bank beforehand on the particular terms and
conditions to be included in the letter of credit. The issuing bank then drafts the letter of

J Emmanuel T. Laryea, “Payment for Paperless Trade: Are There Viable Alternatives to the Documentary
Credits” (2001) 33 L Pol Int’l Bus 3 at 5-10. There are several methods o f financing in international
business transactions. Some o f these include: cash in advance or prepayment, letter o f credit, documentary
collection , and open account.
4 Ibid at 10-11. Documentary credits are an arrangement whereby the importer (buyer-applicant) instructs a
bank (issuing bank) to pay the exporter (seller-beneficiary). The beneficiary is paid either directly or
through another bank located in the seller-beneficiary’s home country (nominated bank) upon the
presentation o f the required drafts and documents.
5 Gao Xiang & Ross P Buckley, “The Unique Jurisprudence o f Letters o f Credit: Its Origins and Sources”
(2003) San Diego Int’l L J 91 at 95.
6Ronald J. Mann, “The Role o f Letters o f Credit in Payment Transactions” (2000) 98 Mich L Rev 2494 at
2518.
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credit. In order for the beneficiary to receive payment, it must present documentation that
conforms to the terms and conditions set forth in the letter of credit.
Ideally, the documentation required should provide the applicant with sufficient
information about the goods and should be relatively easy for the beneficiary to produce.
Generally, the required documentation the beneficiary must produce in an international
transaction include: the commercial invoice, packing list, bill of lading, and insurance
certificate.7 Producing conforming documents and presenting them to the issuing bank
may seem like a rather straightforward procedure. Nonetheless, many beneficiaries
present discrepant or non-complying documents in the majority of transactions.8 For
example, the Uniform Custom and Practices for Documentary Credits 600 (UCP 600)
reports that approximately 70 percent of documents initially presented by beneficiaries
are rejected due to discrepancies.
Ronald Mann’s findings run counter to the traditional explanation of how letters of
credit function.9 Specifically, under the traditional (“assured-payment”) explanation, the
beneficiary is required to present conforming documents in order to be paid. Data
gathered by Mann indicate that applicants waive the discrepancies and pay the
beneficiary. Mann concluded that sophisticated commercial parties pay substantial fee for
letters of credit because they provide the beneficiary with “verification” and
“authentication” services.
The objective of the thesis is to uncover why sophisticated commercial parties pay
substantial fees for the use of letters of credit and subsequently choose not to legally

7 See Chow & Schoenbaum, note (1) at 252.
8 See The International Chamber o f Commerce, Uniform Custom and Practices for Documentary Credits
600, (2007) [UCP 600],
9 Supra Mann note (5).
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enforce them; thereby depriving the applicant of its most significant advantage.
Furthermore, this research examines which particular standard of compliance serves the
best interest of the letter of credit regime and whether equitable remedies are necessary to
protect the beneficiary from the potential oppressive behavior of applicants and issuing
banks.
II. Research Question
Data shows that beneficiaries present non-conforming documents in the
overwhelming majority of presentations.10 Under the strict compliance doctrine, followed
by the majority of courts in letter of credit transactions in the United States, this implies
that beneficiaries are not entitled to payment. However, an empirical study by Ronald
Mann shows that despite this high rate of discrepancy, applicants waive the discrepancies
in over 90 percent of the transactions.11The research question that this dissertation
examines is: why do sophisticated commercial parties pay substantial fees to issue a letter
of credit and subsequently the applicant decides not to legally enforce it, i.e., waive the
discrepancies—thereby depriving the applicant and beneficiary of the advantage of the
letter of credit?
III. Objectives and Hypotheses
Assume Most comfortable Garments Incorporated (“Most Inc”), a seller of garments
based in Jakarta, Indonesia, seeks to sell its garments to Wal-Mart Stores Incorporated
(“Wal-Mart”), a retailer based in Bentonville, Arkansas, United States. Most Inc and
10 For published references to the discrepancy story See Mann supra note 5 at 2503 (his research found that
73 percent o f the presentations by the seller-beneficiary did not conform); Martin Shaw, Documentary
Credit Insight, Spring 1999 at 11 (who reports that “informed observers” report that 50 percent— some say
up to 60 percent or even up 70 percent o f presentations do not conform); and Vincent M. Maulella,
“Payment Pitfalls for the Unwary: How to Make Your Letter o f Credit Work”, World Trade, (1999) at 76
(American banks report that 50 percent to 60 percent o f presentations are found discrepant on first
presentation.
11 Supra note 3 at 2513-2514.

4

Wal-Mart do not have prior business dealings and have valid concerns regarding the
financial strength and reliability of the other party. Most Inc’s concern is that after
producing the goods, loading them, and shipping them off to an American port, Wal-Mart
* 1 2
may become insolvent or refuse to pay for the garments upon arrival.
If Wal-Mart
•

declines to pay, Most Inc. may be obliged to go through great expenses to sue the buyer
in the United States and pursue litigation in an unfamiliar and foreign jurisdiction. Wal
Mart, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with whether the goods tendered by the
seller match the quantity, quality, and description as specified in the underlying sales
contract.*13
To mitigate these fears, the parties may agree to compromise and finance their
transaction through the use of a letter of credit.14 Under such an agreement Wal-Mart
may agree to go to a third party, usually a bank located in its home country, such as Bank
of America, who possesses a strong reputation. Wal-Mart applies for a letter of credit in
favor of the Most Inc. If Bank of America certifies Wal-Mart’s creditworthiness and
accepts its application, it issues the letter of credit and accordingly assumes the direct,
primary, and independent obligation to honor Most Inc.’s presentation of the draft so long
as the conditions set forth in the letter of credit are met.15 This process allows Most Inc to
obtain payment upon shipping the goods contracted for by Wal-Mart and provides it with
the ability to certify that the goods it agreed to purchase in the underlying sales contract
are those that were shipped.

12

Supra Xiang & Buckley note (4) at 96.
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
13
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The example demonstrates how letters of credit function. While this traditional
explanation makes sense in theory, the traditional explanation, with its emphasis on strict
compliance, ignores the reality that beneficiaries overwhelmingly present discrepant
documents. The inability of the traditional explanation to explain this practice has led to
the publication of alternative explanations of why commercial parties select letters of
credit.

•

The primary alternative explanation that has arisen as a response to this reality is
Mann’s “verification” theory which states that the letter of credit verifies the applicant’s
financial solvency.16 Under this alternative explanation, Most Inc., uses Bank of
America’s reputation to assess the likelihood that Wal-Mart will pay for the goods once
Most Inc. has shipped them. Thus, Most Inc., requests that Wal-Mart obtains a letter of
credit from Bank of America. In this example, Most Inc. relies upon the financial
credibility of the Bank of America, and not of that of Wal-Mart, to assess Wal-Mart’s
ability to pay. Most Inc. relies on Bank of America’s reputation, and not that of WalMart’s, because it is easier for it to assess Bank of America’s reputation. Bank of
America is a large financial institution and its financial solvency can easily be assessed
by Most Inc. Furthermore, Bank of America can be seen as effectively vouching for the
reputation of Wal-Mart because reputable banks do not issue letters of credit without
effectively screening the solvency of the buyer-applicant. Accordingly, when Bank of
America issues the letter of credit to the applicant in favor of the beneficiary, it is
effectively “verifying” to the beneficiary the creditworthiness of the applicant. This
“verification” provided by the bank is that the buyer-applicant has been effectively
“screened” and will pay Most Inc.
16 See Mann, note (5).
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Both explanations, however, fail to answer the underlying research question proposed
in this thesis. Specifically, the traditional explanation fails to explain why applicants
choose to overwhelmingly waive discrepant documents presented by beneficiaries as
reported in the overwhelming majority of letter of credit transactions. This practice
deprives the applicant of the intrinsic advantages of letters of credit; its legal
enforceability. Meanwhile, the “verification” explanation focuses solely on the
beneficiary’s need to verify the financial solvency of the applicant and ignores the
applicant’s need to verify that the beneficiary has produced and shipped conforming
goods. Furthermore, it disregards the ability of the applicant to legally enforce the letter
of credit in those circumstances where the beneficiary fails to ship goods that
substantively conform to the underlying sales agreement.
In order to address the aforementioned drawbacks, the author of this thesis proposes
the following two hypotheses and an alternative hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Commercial parties pay substantial fees for letters of credit to finance
their international business transactions because the letter of credit provides the sellerbeneficiary with an assured-payment mechanism—that is, so long as the beneficiary
submits conforming documents, it is entitled to absolute payment from the issuing bank.
Hypothesis 2: Commercial parties select letters of credit because of the “verification”
service it provides to the seller-beneficiary—that is, the letter of credit protects the
beneficiary from insolvent applicants.
If the two hypotheses above are rejected, the alternative hypothesis below cannot be
rejected. Therefore the alternative hypothesis is:

7

Alternative Hypothesis: Commercial parties select letters of credit among the various
payment mechanisms available in international business transactions because they
provide a “bilateral assurance” mechanism—that is, the commercial parties interpret
informational signals, such as the preparation of certain documentation, and determine
whether the other party has substantively completed its underlying obligations under the
contract. If the signals indicate that either party is not performing its obligations, i.e., the
beneficiary has not substantively performed the underlying sales contract or the applicant
refuses to waive minor discrepancies even though the beneficiary has substantively
completed the transaction, then the affected party has the ability to legally enforce the
letter of credit.
IV. Literature Review:
Research in letters of credit has largely focused on both the standards of compliance
and the mechanics of letters of credit.1718Specifically, there exists a rich literature
comparing the various compliance standards adopted by federal courts in the United
States. This literature has studied the advantages and disadvantages of each particular
standard and how courts have both adopted and applied them.
With regards to the mechanics of letters of credit, the literature has largely accepted
the traditional “assured-payment” explanation. The authors that adhere to the traditional

17 See Mann, note (5), Avery Wiener Katz, “Informality as a Bilateral Assurance Mechanism” (2000) 98
Mich L Rev 2554, Clayton P Gillette, “Letters o f Credit as Signals” (2000) Mich L Rev 2537, Margaret L.
Moses, “The Irony o f International Letters o f Credit: They Aren’t Secure but They Usually Work” (2003)
120 Banking LJ 479, and Jacob I. Corre, “Reconciling the Old Theory and the New Evidence” (2000) 98
Mich LR2548.
18 See: (1) Paolo S. Grassi, “Letter o f Credit Transactions: The Bank’s Position in Determining
Documentary Compliance. A Comparative Evaluation Under U.S., Swiss, and German Law” (1995) 7 Pace
Int’l L Rev 81; (2) Kyle Roane, “Hanil Bank v PT. Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero): Continuing the
Quandary o f Documentary Compliance Under International Letter o f Credit” (2004) 41 Hous L Rev 1053;
and (3) John F. Dolan, “Letter-of-Credit Disputes Between the Issuer and its Customer: the Issuer’s Rights
Under the Misnamed “Bifurcated Standard” (1988) 105 Banking LJ 380.
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explanation argue that commercial parties select letters of credit because they provide a
secure method of payment.19 As mentioned above, critical to this explanation is the
seller-beneficiary’s absolute obligation to present conforming documents or drafts.
Therefore, under the “assured-payment” mechanism, the compliance standards play a
central role in the functioning of letters of credit.
Commercial parties, banks, and scholars; however, realized that commercial practice
did not match the traditional explanation.20213Various studies reported that the beneficiaries
were not presenting conforming documents in the majority of the presentations.

Based

on this discovery, scholars attempted to explain this phenomenon. 22
Of particular significance is the empirical study published by Ronald Mann. The
study explains why commercial parties pay substantial fees to use letters of credit when
in practice beneficiaries were presenting nonconforming documents in 73 percent of the
transactions. Under the traditional “assured-payment” explanation this would imply that
the issuing bank has an obligation to refuse to honor the presentation.
To answer his question—why commercial parties select letters of credit while non
conforming documents are overwhelmingly waived—Mann rejects the traditional
“assurance-payment” explanation. Mann asserts that this explanation simply fails because
his data demonstrate that beneficiaries fail to present conforming documents in the
overwhelming majority of cases.

9 -3

19 See Note (1) at 14 at 15. Laryea states that one o f the advantages o f letters o f credit is that they provide a
secure method o f payment.
20 See Note (8) for a list o f the various authors who published work on the issue.
21 See note (8) discussing the various publications discussing discrepancies.
22 See Mann note (5), Clayton P Gillette, “Letters o f Credit as Signals” (2000) Mich L Rev 2537, Margaret
L. Moses, “The Irony o f International Letters o f Credit: They Aren’t Secure but They Usually Work”
(2003) 120 Banking LJ 479, and Jacob I. Corre, “Reconciling the Old Theory and the New Evidence”
(2000) 98 Mich L Rev 2548.
23 Ibid at 2519-2521.
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Mann proposes an alternative explanation as to why commercial parties select letters
of credit. He posits that the applicant “rents” the reputation of the issuing bank. This
allows the seller-beneficiary to verify the credibility of the applicant.24 Central to this
proposition is the assumption that banks have an interest in their reputation and therefore
will not likely agree to issue a letter of credit to an insolvent applicant-buyer.
Mann’s empirical study has been the subject of a wide variety of criticisms. The
criticism ranges from questioning the method by which the data has been collected to the
inadequacy of his proposed “verification” theory.25 The details of criticisms are discussed
in Section (VI) of Chapter Two.
Regardless of the limitations of Mann’s empirical study, it remains the most
important and comprehensive empirical study reported in the field. Mann’s empirical
study provides invaluable insight in answering the fundamental question proposed in this
thesis. Moreover, this thesis examines Mann’s conclusion—letters of credit serve
primarily as a “verification” instrument and not as assurance-of-payment mechanisms—
to assess whether it adequately addresses the commercial practices of sophisticated
commercial parties.
An alternative explanation that attempts to answer the proposed question is put forth
by Avery Katz.26 His “bilateral assurance” mechanism reconciles the “assured payment”
explanation with Mann’s “verification” rationale through the use of informational signals.
In this theory, informational signals—the preparation of particular documentations or
acts—provides the applicant and beneficiary with signals regarding the substantive

24 Ibid at 2521-2524.
25 See Gillette and Katz, note (17).
26 See Katz, note (17).
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performance of the underlying sales contract.27 If the signals indicate that the beneficiary
has substantively performed with regards to the quantity, quality, and description of the
goods, then the applicant is not concerned with discrepancies in the documentation
presented by the beneficiary and will accordingly pay the beneficiary.
The bilateral assurance mechanism is a hybrid approach that combines the theoretical
basis of the traditional explanation with the commercial practices of parties engaged in
international business transactions. The reconciliation of the two theories implies that the
compliance standards continue to play a fundamental role. The research reported in this
thesis addresses the question of which particular standard serves the best interest of this
rationale.
Within the United States, three compliance standards are employed by courts in the
various legal jurisdictions—strict, substantial, and bifurcated.

This can be partially

attributed to the reality that the United States Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue.
This thesis also examines how the different American jurisdictions have defined and
applied the various standards and which particular standard is most appropriate in
explaining the functioning of the letters of credit.
The strict compliance standard is used in most jurisdictions in the United States.
This rule provides that banks need to pay on letters of credits only if the beneficiary
presents drafts and documents that strictly comply with the terms and conditions set in
the letter of credit.

27
28

T1

Ibid at 2565.
Ibid.

29

John F. Dolan, “Strict Compliance with Letters o f Credit: Striking a Fair Balance” (1985) 102 Banking
LJ 18.
30 Ibid at 18.
31 Ibid.
11

Viscount Sumner’s often-quoted statement of strict compliance states: “There is no
room for documents which are almost the same, or which will do just as well.” This is
known as the “mirror-image” approach to strict compliance. Under this rule, the function
of the issuing bank is ministerial. That is, document examiners merely focus on the face
of the beneficiary’s drafts and compare them to the requirements of the letter of credit. If
the drafts strictly comply, the bank honors. If they do not strictly comply, the bank must
dishonor and cannot be held liable. Many courts continue to rigorously enforce this
rule.*33
Throughout the evolution of the case law on strict compliance some courts have
crafted different variations of the rule. Many of these modifications can be attributed to
the courts’ attempts to remedy the potential harsh effects on beneficiaries or
consequences of a literal interpretation of the strict compliance rule. For example, one
court has adopted a common-sense case-by-case approach where minor typographical
errors were not deemed to violate the strict compliance rule. Accordingly, the court
examined the entire documents to see whether they related to the transaction on its face.34
This approach is referred to as a “modified” strict compliance approach.
The most prominent rival to strict compliance is the substantial compliance test. This
standard was established by courts concerned with the negative consequences that

j2 See Equitable Trust Co v Dawson Partners (1927), [1927] Lloyd’s List LR 49, 52 HL (Eng). The United
Kingdom adheres to the strict compliance rule.
33 Various jurisdictions have applied the strict compliance rule. These jurisdictions include: New York,
Texas, and North Carolina, among others in the United States. The following is a list o f cases from those
jurisdictions applying the strict compliance rule: (1) Hanil Bank v Pt. Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero),
2000 WL 254007 (SD NY 2000); (2) Beyene v Irving Trust Co, 762 F Supp (2d) 4 (SD NY 1985); (3) New
Braunfels Nat. Bank v Odiorne, 780 SW (2d) 313 (TX App Ct 1989); (4) Dubose Steel, Inc v Branch
Banking and Trust Co, 324 SE (2d) 859 (NC App Ct 1985).
j4 Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp v Bank o f China, 167 F Supp (2d) 940 at 947 (SD Tex 2000).

12

resulted from the application of strict compliance.35 Judges adopting substantial
compliance were largely reacting to the hyper technical insistence by issuing banks that
every “i” be dotted and every “t” be crossed. Thus, judges looked to what they deemed to
be “fair” when resolving allegations of wrongful payment.36 Courts accept deviation from
the literal terms and conditions of the letter of credit by asking the following: “whether
the deviation creates an uncertainty in the document checker’s mind as to an essential
aspect of the document checker’s verification”; or they may ask “whether the discrepancy
misled the document checker into thinking that there was compliance with the credit”; or
whether the discrepancy misled the document checker to the document checker’s
detriment.37
The bifurcated standard was noted by Kozolchyk in the mid-1960s while examining
the standard of strict compliance. He found that depending on who was suing whom—(a)
the seller-beneficiary suing the issuing bank after a wrongful dishonor on the one hand or
on the other hand, where either (b) the issuing bank was suing or (c) where the issuing
bank was being sued by the buyer-applicant upon honor of a presentation—courts
adopted different versions of compliance.38 He found American courts employed the
strict compliance when the seller-beneficiary sued the issuing bank based on the
assumption that issuing banks generally acted in good faith when rejecting a sellerbeneficiary’s presentation. In contrast, in the cases of (b) or (c) above, courts assumed*2
>5 See note 14. Dolan identifies several cases that have applied the substantial compliance test. These cases
are: (1) Banco Espanol de Credito v State St. Bank & Trust Co, 385 F Supp 230 (2d) 230 (CA Mass 1967);
(2) Crocker Commercial Services Inc v Countryside Bank, 538 F Supp 1360 ( ND 111 1981); Flagship
Cruises, Ltd. v New England Merchants Nat. Bank o f Boston, 569 F Supp (2d) 699 (CA Mass 1978); and
Tosco Corp v FDIC, 723 F Supp (2d) 1242 (CA Tenn 1983). Thus, Massachusetts, Illinois, and Tennessee
are among the states that apply the substantial compliance standard.
~’6 Supra Dolan note (27) at 24.
!? Boris Kozolchyk, “Strict Compliance and the Reasonable Document Checker” (1990) 56 Brook L Rev
45 at 67.
38 Ibid at 69-70.
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that buyer-applicants would shift, if they could, the possibility of risk to the issuing bank
and accordingly the courts employed a substantial compliance test.
The determination of the particular standard of compliance is crucial to this thesis.
Depending upon which particular standard is adopted—strict, substantial, or bifurcated—
the beneficiary has the ability to determine whether or not to strictly or substantially
comply with the terms and conditions of the letter of credit. For example, if the signal the
beneficiary receives from the applicant indicates that it will waive any non-conforming
documents, then the beneficiary does not have to invest substantial effort in ensuring
strict compliance. On the other hand, if the signals sent by the applicant indicate that it
will not waive minor discrepancies regardless of the beneficiary’s substantive
performance of the underlying contract, then the beneficiary has the ability to strictly
comply with the terms and conditions and oblige the bank to pay.
Throughout the evolution of letters of credit case law, various equitable remedies
have arisen to remedy the potential harsh effects of strict compliance. Among the most
commonly proposed equitable remedies are good-faith and estoppel. This thesis examines
the theoretical basis of these remedies and the manner by which they function. Another
objective is to determine whether such remedies are required to ensure the functioning of
the letters of credit regime.
V. Methodology:
The research reported in this thesis has been designed to test whether the traditional
“assured-payment” or the “verification” explanations completely explain why
commercial parties pay substantial fees for a letter of credit and subsequently choose not39
39 See Transamerica Délavai Inc v Citibank, NA, 545 F Supp 200 (SD NY 1982) and Bank of Cochin Ltd. v
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co, 612 F Supp 1533 (SD NY 1985). The latter case ultimately rejected
applying the bifurcated standard; however, its analysis provides a detailed definition o f it.
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to legally enforce it. If the traditional and “verification” explanations are found to be
incapable of explaining why applicants overwhelmingly waives discrepancies, then an
alternative explanation emphasizing the role of informational signals will explain the
commercial practices of parties engaged in letters of credit.
Data collected from the United States is used to test the hypotheses posed in this
research. The United States is the largest economy in the world and New York City is
domicile to the greatest number of banks in the United States. Furthermore, the majority
of leading authors and academic journals are based within the United States. Moreover,
both the qualitative and quantitative data used in this research primarily depend on
studies, journals, and empirical studies published in the United States.
While qualitative and quantitative researches are two distinct approaches to
understanding knowledge, one should not be carried away with their differences. As
practitioners of both research methodologies use different approaches, their differences
lie in the peculiar situations and questions relevant to their respective work. Accordingly,
it may be stated that qualitative and quantitative researchers are pursuing similar overall
objectives and have much to leam from each other.40
This thesis employs both qualitative and quantitative research to answer the research
questions. It primarily relies upon the use of qualitative research reported in the literature
to describe the current theories in the field. Specifically, qualitative research is employed
to gain a fundamental understanding of the traditional explanation of how letters of credit
function. It also utilizes qualitative research in the cases that are reviewed when

40 Ted Palys & Chris Atchison, Research Decisions: Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives, 4th ed
(Toronto: Thomson Nelson, 2007) at 19.
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discussing and demonstrating how American courts have attempted to explain the various
standards of compliance.
a. Qualitative Research
Qualitative research focuses on a human-centered approach because the objective of
understanding human behavior in social sciences is fundamentally different from those
challenges faced by natural science.41 Accordingly, many social scientists adhere to the
philosophy of phenomenologism. This philosophy maintains that any attempt to
understand human behavior must take into account that human beings are cognitive
beings who actively perceive and make sense of the world around them, have the ability
to abstract from their experience, ascribe meaning to their behavior and the world around
them, and are affected by those meanings.42
Many phenomenologists believe that using a quantitative measurement removes
researchers further from understanding human experiences.43 Therefore, qualitative
researchers do not employ empirical figures in their studies. Closely related to the
rejection of empirical analysis is the belief that statistical analysis cannot completely
define explanation or understanding.44
Qualitative researchers emphasize inductive approaches.45 Such an approach entails
observations in the field prior to generating theoretical concepts. In contrast to the
quantitative approach which begins with theory that accounts for the phenomenon under
consideration, the qualitative approach generally begins with individual case studies in

41

Ibid at 7.
Ibid.
43
Ibid at 9.
44
Ibid.
45
Ibid at 10.

42
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context, trying to understand each situation on its own, and leaving open the question of
whether general theories can be created to explain the phenomenon.46
Of particular relevance to the research reported in this thesis is descriptive research.
This research is a form of qualitative research and involves either identifying a
phenomenon or research that examines a situation as it is. Unlike experimental
quantitative research, descriptive research does not seek to change behavior or conditions
nor is it intended to find cause-and-effect relationships.47 The major purpose of
descriptive research is to describe the characteristics of a phenomenon. Thus, it seeks to
answer the who, what, when, where and how questions.48 A common example of
descriptive research is the monthly publications by the Department of Labor in the United
States detailing unemployment and other statistics related to the labor force.
Proponents of descriptive research argue that it can accurately and clearly illustrate
the characteristics of a group of situation.49 Descriptive research is often used to identify
or describe attributes of some group or set. The group under study can be composed of
people, documents, organizations, animals, or virtually any other discrete set. The totality
of the group under study is known as the “population,” and a subset of the population is
referred to as the “sample.”50
This thesis utilizes descriptive research through its analysis of the traditional
“assured-payment” explanation. Specifically, various journal publications describing the
theoretical basis of this theory are reviewed to provide a fundamental understanding of
46 Ibid.
47 Paul Leedy and Jeanne Ellis Ormrod, Practical Research: Planning and Design, 8th ed (Upper Saddle
River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2005) at 191-192.
48 William G. Zikmund, Business Research Methods (Cincinnati, OH: Thomson/Southwestem, 2003) at 55
56.
49 Sut Sakchutchawam, “The Problem and Solution o f Export and Import Documents Presented Against
Letter o f Credit for Payment” (2008) 9 Bus Rev Cambridge 133 at 136.
50 Ibid.
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how letters of credit function under this approach. Furthermore, descriptive research is
also employed in describing the “bilateral assurance” mechanism and how the issues of
the standards of compliance, equitable remedies, role of issuing banks, and waivers
operate under the proposed explanation.
As far as the standards of compliance are concerned, several American federal cases
are reviewed to determine how courts have applied the theories in actual disputes. Federal
cases as commercial parties tend to litigate letter of credit transactions in federal courts.
Accordingly, various American jurisdictions are examined depending on their adoption
of a particular standard of compliance. An emphasis is placed on the American cases
because the availability of data.
Finally, descriptive research is employed to propose an alternative answer to the
fundamental research question. The “bilateral assurance” mechanism is defined,
explained, and supplemented with Mann’s empirical study,
b. Quantitative Research
Flistorically, empirical evidence has largely played a marginal role in legal
scholarship.51 Professor Schuck states that doctrinal and theoretical-based research
account for nearly all of the legal scholarship, if one views it in its entirety.52 Empirical
studies, however, have in the recent past, gained much favor in legal scholarship. As
theoretical and doctrinal research mature, legal scholars employ empirical studies to
supplement their work. Many theoretical and doctrinal approaches rest on key empirical
studies. Theoretical and doctrinal studies may help to clarify underlying empirical

51 Peter H. Shuck, “Why Don’t Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?” (1989) 39 J Legal Educ 323
at 329.
52 Ibid.
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assumptions.

When these key assumptions are identified and reduced to testable

hypotheses, they become very well suited for rigorous empirical testing. Thus, legal
empirical studies largely complement traditional theoretical and doctrinal approaches.
Further developments in legal research can also explain the increase in legal empirical
scholarship during the past two decades. There has been a substantial increase in law
journals that cover a broad array of legal fields.*
545The recent explosion of law and
economics literature provides a vivid example of how this phenomenon has developed.
Many legal scholars, as well as judges, have employed economics to explain the
rationality of human behavior or the costs associated with a particular legal remedy.53
Most empirical studies are rather simple from a technical standpoint. Independent
variables are identified and compared to an output variable. Where present, statistically
significant correlations are found. The difficultly that arises in empirical studies is
ascribing meaning to these correlations.56
Quantitative research has been defined as research methods that emphasize numerical
precision.57 This is the approach taken by the natural sciences who view humans as just
another organism. It has also been heavily influenced by positivism. The term
“positivism” expresses the idea that the world consists of phenomena which are “real,
certain, precise, organic, and relative” and that knowledge is gained only in the
description of the coexistence and succession of such phenomena.58 Very closely knitted
with positivism is its realist perspective. When applied in the context of positivism,
5j Michael Heise, “The Past, Present, and Future o f Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision Making
and the New Empiricism” (2002) U 111 L Rev 819 at 824.
54 Ibid at 827.
55 Ibid.
56 Harry T. Edwards, “Pitfalls o f Empirical Studies That Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting
Appellate Decision Making” (2009) 58 Duke L J 1897 at 13.
57 Palys & Atchison, supra note 4 (37) at 3.
5i Ibid at 3-4.
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realism implies adhering strictly to the notion that there is a reality out there awaiting
discovery. Positivism seeks to uncover the facts and to understand the laws and principles
that explain those facts.59
Another characteristic of quantitative research lies in the mechanistic function with
respect to the variables that are included in any analysis.60 The world is made up of
causes and effects. Researchers identify the causes and observe the effects allowing them
to formulate principles that describe the action.61*Such an approach recognizes that
certain processes (such as thinking in humans) are deemed irrelevant; and all that matters
is what goes in (the causes) and what comes out (the effects or outcomes). Thus, only
those causes that are external to individuals are deemed “legitimate” to test, largely
because such causes are amenable to observation and testing.
C'l

Quantitative research has a preference for aggregate data. Aggregated data allows
for the recognition of general trends or patterns to be made visible. This is in contrast to
an idiographic analysis, which is oriented toward case study.64
Finally, quantitative analysis ultimately adopts a deductive approach.65 For the classic
positivists, prediction was the ultimate goal. For these intellectuals, understanding a
phenomenon entails being able to predict its occurrence.66 The deductive method
involves making predictions and assessing their success in a continuing process of
theoretical development. This begins by formulating a theory, deducing a hypothesis
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Ibid at 4.
Ibid at 5
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Ibid at 6-7.
60

20

from the theory, gathering data to test the hypothesis, and then either looking for another
situation in which to test the theory or discarding or revising the theory.

fil

This thesis employs quantitative research by examining Sat Sakchutchawarn’s
empirical study regarding the problem of discrepancies within the context of letters of
credit in an attempt to demonstrate the shortcomings of the traditional explanation.
Sakchutchawam’s empirical study collected data from ten American federal cases and
500 internet websites. He subjected his raw data to statistical analysis. His research
allowed him to show, why, where, and what the discrepancies are. Based upon his
statistical results he concluded that the high rate of discrepancies could be attributed to:
excessive terms and conditions in the letters of credit, ambiguous provisions of the
Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP), and clerical errors.
Ronald Mann’s empirical data is also used to test the hypotheses posed in this thesis.
Mann’s research is the leading empirical study completed in the field of letters of credit.
His study collected data from 500 letter of credit transactions in the United States.
Further, he supplemented his data with telephone interviews with American and Japanese
bankers regularly engaged in letters of credit transactions. His empirical data is used to
demonstrate the inability of the traditional explanation to justify the commercial practices
of certain buyers and sellers. Furthermore, his data is used to explain the “bilateral
assurance” mechanism.
Though Sakchutchawam and Mann sought to answer two different research
questions, their data complements one another by demonstrating the fundamental678
67 Ibid at 7.
68 Sat Sakchutchawam, The Problem o f Presentation o f Discrepant Export and Import Documents against
Letter o f Credit for Payment and Financing, (PhD Thesis, Union Institute and University 2005)
[unpublished].
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problem with the letters of credit regime: the high rate of discrepancies in the American
context. Furthermore, Mann’s study proposes an alternative account for why commercial
parties select letters of credit, i.e., a “verification” purpose. The inability of this theory to
answer the proposed research questions is subjected to testing by identifying its
shortcomings.
VI. Thesis Organization:
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter Two begins with an
explanation of the traditional “assured-payment”, the most commonly supported view in
the literature. This view states that letters of credit are a prompt and assured method of
payment because so long as the documents submitted by the beneficiary strictly conform
to the terms and conditions of the letter of credit, it is entitled to absolute payment. This
explanation is then followed by a discussion of discrepancies. The overwhelming
majority of letters of credit transactions contain discrepancies. This entails that the
beneficiary is not entitled to payment. More importantly, however, is the inability of the
traditional explanation to justify such practice by the beneficiary. Thus, a thorough
review of the particular discrepancies in the transactions is pursued. Then, an alternative
explanation of letters of credit is examined. Finally, Chapter Two concludes with various
criticisms of Mann’s explanation.
Chapter Three discusses the different standards of compliance applied by various
federal courts throughout the United States. The three standards of compliance—strict,
substantial, and bifurcated—have drawn great attention in the literature. Any particular
standard adopted by a court may have a tremendous impact on whether a beneficiary is
entitled to payment. For example, if a court adopts a mirror-image approach of strict
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compliance, then a simple misspelling of a name can prevent the beneficiary from
obtaining payment. On the other hand, under the substantial compliance standard, such a
misspelling would allow for payment. Accordingly, Chapter Three extensively evaluates
the three standards by examining their fundamental characteristics and observing how
various courts have implemented them in case law. The objective of the chapter is to
provide a deep understanding of how these standards function in practice.
Chapter Four presents the proposed “bilateral assurance” mechanism. It emphasizes
the issues of asymmetric information and moral hazard in long-distance commercial
relationships and assimilates information signaling theory. Specifically, it explains why
sophisticated commercial parties pay substantial fees to obtain a letter of credit by stating
that strict compliance is largely irrelevant so long as the applicant is assured that the
underlying sales contract is substantively performed and the beneficiary is confident that
the applicant will waive any discrepancies. Through the particular actions (signals) of the
respected commercial parties, the beneficiary and applicant are capable of interpreting
their actions and determining whether or not to strictly conform to the terms and
conditions of the letters of credit. In most circumstances, the beneficiary does not submit
conforming documents because it substantively performs the underlying sales contract.
However, in those circumstances where the beneficiary interprets the signals to indicate
that the applicant is not willing to waive, regardless of the substantive completion of the
underlying sales contract, the beneficiary can strictly conform to the terms and
conditions. Thus, the letter of credit is used in its traditional form—legally enforced—
only in those end-game situations.
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Chapter Four also investigates the issue of strict compliance within the context of the
“bilateral assurance” mechanism. Specifically, it adopts the “modified” strict compliance
standard because the threat of not being paid for failure to strictly comply serves as an
incentive to the beneficiary to substantively perform the underlying sales contract.
Further, it provides the beneficiary with a “safety net” for those circumstances where the
applicant may refuse to waive minor discrepancies that are not related to the quantity,
quality, or description of the goods. Further, the issue of equitable remedies is also
rejected because they run counter to the spirit of strict compliance. Finally, the issue of
clerical errors is addressed. Specifically, several simple measures are recommended for
parties who engage in the use of letters of credit.
The issue of the standard of compliance is also examined in Chapter Four within the
context of the “bilateral assurance” mechanism. It argues that strict compliance needs to
be adopted to protect both the applicant and beneficiary. Moreover, the necessity of
equitable remedies is emphasized. Specifically, the questions of whether the beneficiary
needs to such protection and what these remedies imply to the functioning of the letters
of credit regime are addressed. An explanation of why the applicant places excessive
terms and conditions in the letter of credit and then subsequently waives them is also
answered. Also, the issue of clerical issues is addressed.
Finally, the major conclusions drawn from this thesis and suggestions for future
research are provided in Chapter Five
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CHAPTER TWO
THE UNDERLYING ROLE OF LETTERS OF CREDIT; DISCREPANCIES;
AND ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
I. Introduction
This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the various finance options available to
commercial parties engaged in an international business transaction. Next, various
definitions of the letter of credit under diverse legal regimes are explored. A detailed
discussion of how the letter of credit functions and the traditional explanation as to why
commercial parties select letters of credit is then carried out. A detailed examination of
the problem of discrepancies is pursued in order to identify the underlying questions of:
(1) why do commercial parties select letters of credit? and (2) what actions ensure the
seller-beneficiary payment under the letter of credit? Finally, a discussion of the
alternative explanation of the use of letters of credit is carried out. Specifically, reviews
of Ronald Mann’s “verification” argument as well as numerous critiques are explored in
order to provide the reader with a comprehensive review of the literature in the field.
II. Financing Mechanisms in International Business Transactions
Aside from letters of credit, there are numerous alternative finance mechanisms that
commercial parties may select to finance their international business transactions. The
discussion below focuses upon the most common methods of finance used in such
business transactions.
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The first of these options is cash in advance or prepayment. This is an arrangement
whereby the buyer, pursuant to a sales contract, transfers funds into an account accessible
to the seller in advance of the manufacture or shipment of the goods.69701
Another alternative is documentary collection. This is a device whereby a bank acts
on the request or instruction of an exporter to collect payment from an importer by
presenting drafts and other relevant shipping documents to the importer. In the classic
case the exporter ships the goods in accordance with the terms of the contract and
submits to his bank (the remitting bank) the necessary shipping documents together with
a draft drawn from the importer. The exporter’s bank sends the documents and draft to its
correspondent bank (the collecting bank) in the importer’s home country for presentation
to the importer stipulating whether the transaction should be executed as “document on
payment” (D/P) or “documents on acceptance” (D/A) basis. If it is on a D/P basis, the
collecting bank releases documents in exchange for payment and remits the payment to
the remitting bank which pays the exporter. If collection is on a D/A basis, the collecting
bank releases documents upon acceptance of the draft by the importer. If the draft is
accepted it is returned to the exporter which will usually discount the draft (agree to
receive a slightly lesser amount in return for immediate access to the funds).
Document collections provide the importer with the advantage of inspecting the
documents of title before the bill is paid or collected. From the exporter’s perspective,
however, it provides the disadvantage of allowing the importer to dishonor its draft by

69 Emmanuel T. Laryea, supra note (2) at 5-6.
70 Ibid, at 8.
71 Ibid at 8-9.
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refusing to pay or accept it, at a time when the goods are in transit or in the importer’s
country.72*
Open account is an arrangement whereby the importer undertakes to pay a certain
sum of money into a nominated account—usually the exporter’s account—upon a
specified period of time after the performance of a particular act by the exporter, usually
n 'i

the shipment of goods. Under this method of payment, the exporter ships the goods and
then delivers to the importer the shipping documents, or the actual goods, together with
an invoice demanding payment. The importer, in turn, sends a bank draft or check to the
exporter for the contract price.74*The most significant advantage of this method of
payment is the avoidance of paying banking commissions. Its largest disadvantage is that
it does not offer the buyer effective protection in the event of the importer’s failure to
pay; that is, it has no cause of action until the importer fails to pay, and thus the seller
cannot repossess the goods.

7S

III. Commercial Letters of Credit
The Uniform Custom and Practices for Documentary Credits 600 and Revised Article
5 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) both define letters of credit similarly. Revised
Article 5 provides a more elaborate definition while the UCP 600 takes a broader
approach.

72

Ibid at 10.
Ibid at 6.
74
Ibid at 7.
75
Ibid.
73

27

Article 2 of the UCP 600 defines a letter of credit as “any arrangement, however
named or described, that is irrevocable and thereby constitutes a definite undertaking of
the issuing bank to honor a complying presentation.”
UCC Article 5, §5-102(10) defines a letter of credit as “definite undertaking ... by an
issuer to a beneficiary at the request or for the account of an applicant or, in the case of a
financial institution, to itself or for its own account, to honor a documentary presentation
by payment or delivery of an item of value."767778
Regardless of whether a letter of credit is defined as an “arrangement” or
“undertaking” it is useful to view it as an instrument, issued to a beneficiary by an issuer
on the account of an applicant, by which the issuer promises to honor a draft or demand
for payment so long as the conditions set forth in the letter are met.
a. History o f the Use o f Letters o f Credit
Letters of credit have a rich history in international commerce and in the law of
merchant. This history dates back to 12th century Europe when merchants used letters of
credit in the form of drafts or bills of exchange to make payments in the international
sales of goods.7980The bill was a request or order for payment that through mercantile use
became a well-established method of payment. The use of the bills allowed merchants to
avoid carrying large sums of gold or silver and to solve the problem of the unavailability
of currency to make large payments.

on

76 International Chamber o f Commerce, Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, Art 2
(2007).
77 UCC §5-102(10) (1995).
78 Gao Xiang & Ross P Buckley, supra note (4) at 95.
79 Chow & Schoenbaum, supra note (1) at 251.
80 Ibid.
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The modem form of the letter of credit largely began to take shape in the middle of
the 19th century and developed fully after the First World War. Several factors
contributed to the emergence of the letter of credit at this particular time period including:
1) Great increase in world trade,
2) Fluctuations in currencies, and
3) Unstable economies.
b.

Q1

Forms o f Letters o f Credit

There are various forms of letters of credits. The different types of letters seek to
serve different purposes based upon the particular interests of the parties involved.
The standby letter of credit is an instrument used by a buyer to pay a seller for the
sale of goods.8182 It is used to secure the obligation by the seller to perform the sales
contract for the benefit of the buyer. In many instances it is used to finance long-term
sales contract for equipment and consulting services. The buyer protects itself from the
risk of non-performance by the seller by requiring the following arrangement to secure
performance: the seller establishes a standby letter of credit in favor of the buyer that is
payable upon the submission of a pro forma declaration by the buyer that the seller has
failed to perform the contract.8384The buyer’s bank then pays the buyer upon the bank’s
guarantee. The buyer’s bank subsequently forwards the documents and demand for
reimbursement to the seller’s bank. The seller’s bank reimburses the buyer’s bank under
the standby letter of credit. Then the seller’s bank forwards the documents to the seller
and the seller reimburses its bank.
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81 Ibid.
82 Ibid at 303-304.
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IV. Commercial Letters of Credit: The Traditional Explanation (“Assured
Payment”)
This thesis focuses upon the commercial letter of credit. This form of credit is used in
the international sales of goods. It is a financing mechanism whereby buyers and sellers
in different countries can engage in a relatively easy, safe, and inexpensive financing
arrangement. The following scenario is typical of how the commercial letter of credit
functions in the international context.
Assume a seller in Vietnam wants to sell goods to a buyer in New York. The buyer
and seller, however, do not have prior course of dealings and have valid concerns
regarding the financial strength and reliability of the other party. The seller’s concern is
that after producing the goods, loading them, and shipping them off to New York, the
buyer may become insolvent or refuse to pay for the goods upon arrival. If the buyer
declines to pay, the seller may be obliged to go through great expense to sue the buyer in
New York and pursue litigation in an unfamiliar foreign jurisdiction. The buyer in turn is
also concerned about the seller’s financial strength and whether the goods tendered by the
seller match the quantity, quality, and description as specified in the sales contract.
To address the parties concerns, they may agree to compromise and finance their
transaction by way of a letter of credit. Under such an agreement, the buyer may agree to
go to a third party, usually a bank, and apply for a letter of credit in favor of the seller. If
the bank certifies the buyer’s creditworthiness and accepts the buyer’s application, it
issues the letter of credit and assumes the direct, primary, and independent obligation to
honor the seller’s presentation of the draft so long as the conditions set forth in the letter
are met.
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1. L/C Payment Contract

The example of the seller in Vietnam and the buyer in New York also demonstrates
that the commercial letter of credit involves three transactions.85 The first among these
transactions is the agreement between the buyer and seller. The seller agrees to sell the
goods to the buyer and the buyer agrees to pay the seller by way of a letter of credit. The
second transaction is between the buyer and a bank, whereby the bank issues the credit in
favor of the seller and the buyer agrees to reimburse the bank and pay a fee. The final

85Xiang and Buckley, supra note (4) at 97.
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transaction is between the bank and seller, whereby the bank promises to honor the draft
•

so long as the conditions of the letter of credit are met.

oz:

The example above also demonstrates that letters of credit generally involves several
parties.

on

The party establishing the credit is the applicant and the party entitled to

payment is the beneficiary of the credit. In most commercial letters of credit, the buyer is
the applicant and the seller is the beneficiary.

oo

The third party is the issuing bank. The

applicant’s bank is the issuing bank.86*89 It undertakes to honor the letter of credit against a
specified set of documents. The issuing bank receives reimbursement and a fee for the
amount of credit from the applicant.90 Often an issuing bank engages another bank
located in the beneficiary’s locality that the beneficiary is familiar with. This bank is
known as the confirming bank.91 The confirming bank independently assumes all of the
obligations of the issuing bank by adding its own promise to honor the seller’s
presentation of documents. Accordingly, the beneficiary is afforded the protection of two
banks. If the confirming bank appropriately pays the beneficiary upon the presentation of
documents, then the issuing bank reimburses it. If the confirming bank wrongfully
refuses to honor presentation, then it is liable for wrongful dishonor.

86 Ibid.
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Ibid at 97.
89
Ibid.

88

90

Chow & Schoenbaum, supra note (1) at 252.

91

Ibid.
92
Ibid.

32

Diagram 2.2 Payment by a Letter of Credit

2. D ocum ents Proving Shipm ents

1. Shipment of Goods

For the seller to be entitled to payment under a commercial letter of credit, it must
submit various documents. These documents generally include:
•

Bill of lading,

•

Commercial invoice,

•

Insurance certificate,

•

Packing list, and
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•

Other documents required in the letter of credit.

QT

The issuing bank is absolutely obliged to pay against the documents so long as the
documents presented comply with the conditions set forth in the letter.*
94 If the issuing
bank pays, then it is entitled to the reimbursement of the credit from the buyerapplicant.95 If the issuing bank refuses to honor a demand for payment that complies with
the terms of the credit, then the issuing bank may be liable to the presenter of the draft for
wrongful dishonor.96978If issuing bank makes improper payment, that is, it pays against
non-conforming documents in violation of the conditions of the letter of credit, then the
•

issuing bank loses its right to receive reimbursement from the buyer applicant.

Q7

This arrangement is of great commercial utility as it provides the various parties with
assurance they need to pursue international transactions. The seller is able to maintain
ownership of the goods until it presents the documents to the issuing bank, at which time
it is either paid or its draft is accepted. The seller faces almost no risk of non-payment
from the buyer because the issuing bank has been substituted for the buyer.99 Meanwhile,
to ensure that the buyer receives the goods it bargained for, the letter of credit makes
certain that the seller will not be paid until the required documents, which not only
guarantees that the seller has completed its obligations under the sales contract, but also
represents ownership of the goods, are presented to the issuing bank.100 The system is
protected against abuse by the fact that it functions in a manner whereby neither the
buyer nor seller are ever in control of the goods and the money at the same time.
9j Ibid at 107. These documents are explained in detail in Chapter 4.
94 Chow & Schoenbaum, supra note (1) at 252.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
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a.

The Independence Principle

One of the most fundamental principles of letter of credit law is the independence
principle.1011023This principle holds that the letter of credit is independent from the
underlying sales contract. UCP 600 Article 4 states that:
A credit by its nature is a separate transaction from the sale or other
contract on which it may be based. Banks are in no way concerned with or
bound by such contract, even if any reference whatsoever to it is included
in the letter. Consequently, the undertaking of a bank to honor, to
negotiate or to fulfill any other obligation under the credit is not subject to
claims or defenses by the applicant resulting from its relationships with
107
the issuing bank or the beneficiary.
Furthermore, UCP 600 Article 5 provides “Banks deal with documents and not with
goods, services or performance to which the documents may relate.”

1OT

§5-103(d) of Revised Article 5 of the UCC states, “Rights and obligations of an issuer
to a beneficiary or a nominated person under a letter of credit are independent of the
existence, performance, or nonperformance of a contract or arrangement out of which the
letter of credit arises of which underlies it.. .”104
The independence principle has been confirmed by case law. In Maurice O ’Meara
Co., the New York Court of Appeal was confronted with a bank’s refusal to honor three
sight drafts against a confirmed irrevocable letter of credit.105 The letter of credit dealt
with the purchase of various types of paper. The complaint alleged that the three drafts

101 Ibid, at 119.
102 UCP 600, art 4.
103 UCP 600, art 5.
104 UCC §5-103(d).
105 Maurice O ’Meara Co v National Park Bank ofNew York, 146 NE 636 at 637 (C A N Y 1925).
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presented by the beneficiary failed to comply with the terms of the sales contract.
Accordingly, the buyer brought suit against the bank.106
In dealing with the relationship between the letter of credit and sales contract, the
court noted that the letter of credit was not connected with the purchase and sale of the
paper.107 The sales contract was between the buyer and seller and did not concern the
bank. The bank’s obligation was simply to pay against the documents if the documents
complied with the terms specified in the letter of credit.108 If the paper did not comply
with the order in any manner, then the buyer’s remedy against the seller was for
damages.109 The bank was only concerned in the drafts and the documents accompanying
them.110 That was the limits of its interests.
The independence principle implies that the credit contract is separate and
independent of the performance of the sales contract and that breach or non-performance
of the sales contract alone is not a defense to payment under the letter of credit.111 The
documents that are required to be submitted for payment under the letter of credit are
linked to the performance of the sales contract because they provide evidence that
conforming goods have been shipped. The documents themselves and not the underlying
performance of the sales contract are essential for payment under the terms of the
credit.11213Once the documents complying with the letter of credit are submitted to the
bank, it must pay the beneficiary regardless of non-performance of the sales contract.

106 Ibid at 636-638.
107 Ibid at 639.
108
1Ibid.
109
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111 Chow & Schoenbaum, supra note (1) at 269.
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The independence principle serves two fundamental purposes that ultimately promote
the commercial utility of the letter of credit.114 First, the beneficiary is provided with a
secure and efficient method of payment so long as it presents conforming documents. The
beneficiary does not have to fear that the bank will become entangled with issues relating
to performance of the underlying contract as this can be time consuming and complex.115
Second, the independence principle simplifies the role of banks.116 Banks merely act as
“document merchants.” They need not concern themselves with the performance of the
underlying contract in making payment; but only need to verify whether the submitted
documents conform to the terms of the credit.117 This task is relatively simple and
straightforward. More importantly if banks have to determine whether the underlying
contract had been performed before they could pay on the letter of credit, this would
create significant burdens on banks such as requiring banks to examine whether contracts
outside their experience and expertise have been properly performed. These complex
tasks ultimately burden banks and increase the costs of international credit
transactions. 118
•

V. Discrepancies
Discrepancy (non-conforming documents) means any document, or any part of a
document, that does not exactly conform to the terms and conditions of a letter of
credit.119 The significance of discrepancies in documents submitted by the beneficiary is
that under the strict compliance standard, the beneficiary is not entitled to payment.

114 Ibid.

115 Ibid.
U6Ibid.
117 Ibid.
118
'Ibid.
119
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Accordingly, the beneficiary has a strong incentive to ensure that the documents it
presents to the issuing bank exactly conform to the terms and conditions of the letter of
credit. Interestingly, however, empirical data suggests that a substantial, and at times
overwhelmingly majority of presentations by seller-beneficiaries, contain
discrepancies.

Therefore, an examination of w h a t these discrepancies are is crucial.

Sat Sakchutchawam’s research examines the nature of discrepancies in letter of credit
transactions. To answer the questions of w h e re,

w h y,

and h ow the discrepancies occur,

Sakchutchawam suggests two hypotheses in order to provide a benchmark into the
investigation of these questions.12012112 First—the more excessive the terms and conditions of
the letter of credit, the more likely one is to find discrepancies. Second—the more
ambiguous the context of the UCP 500, the more likely one is to find discrepancies.
Sakchutchawam concludes that both hypotheses are accurate based upon the fact that 49
percent of the discrepancy were a result of excessive terms and conditions in the letters of
credits and that 29 percent of the discrepant documents were the result of ambiguous
articles of the UCP 500.123
To test his hypotheses Sakchutchawam collected import and export documents as
well as information on letters of credit from the US District Court of New York City,
New York, the US District Court in Nashville, Tennessee, the US District Court in
Houston, Texas, and international trading companies in New Jersey.124

120 See Mann, note (5).
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid at 10.
123 Ibid at 160.
124 Ibid at 54.
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Table 2.1 reveals the examination of ten lawsuits filed in various jurisdictions in the
United States revealed a total of 22 discrepancies.125*Of the total 22 discrepancies, a total
of 11 (50 percent), could be attributed to their failure to comply with the terms and
conditions of the letter of credit.

A total of seven discrepancies (31.8 percent) did not

comply with the provisions of the UCP 500.127*Discrepancies that could be attributed to
the clerical work of the commercial parties totaled four times (18.2 percent) of the total
data. Accordingly, a total of 50 percent of discrepancies in the document did not comply
with the terms and conditions of the letter of credit while 31 percent of discrepancies in
the documents did not comply with the relevant provisions of the UCP 500.
Table 2.1 Sakchutchawarn’s Analysis o f Discrepancies in 10 Federal Cases in the United States
Type of Discrepancy

Frequency of Occurrence

Total Percentages

Terms and Conditions o f L/C

11

50

UCP Provisions

7

31.8

Clerical Errors

4

18.2

Total Discrepancies in 10 Cases

22

100

Based on data collected from 500 internet sites, Sakchutchawam found discrepancies
of documents that did not comply with the terms and conditions and the excessive
requirements of the letter of credit in 49 percent of the total data collected.129 His research
divided the observed discrepancies into 32 characteristics. Moreover, his analysis also
showed the frequency of occurrence of each discrepancy. The frequency of the
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occurrence of each description was out of a total of 500 letter of credit transactions.130
Table 2.2 reveals that the most common occurrence was the consignee and notifying
parties differed from those stated in the letter of credit (261) occurrences. Other
discrepancies which occurred very frequently included: packing list required too much
information (259); the invoice omitted certain conditions (257); merchandise description
differed from the letter of credit (155); and shipment by ocean rather than air (145).131
Table 2.2 Illustrating Sakchutchawarn’s Results from 500 Internet Websites Regarding Excessive
Terms and Conditions
Type

Terms and Conditions o f L/C (49
percent).

Description of Discrepancy

Frequency of Occurrence

1. Consignee and notifying parties
differed from those stated on L/C.
2. Packing list required too much
information.
3. Invoice
omitted
certain
conditions.
4. Merchandise description differed
from L/C.
5. Shipment by ocean rather then
air.

261

259
257
155
145

For his second hypothesis—the more ambiguous the language of UCP 500 articles,
the more likely one is to find discrepancies—Sakchutchawam’s examination of 500
websites from the internet revealed that 29 percent of the total data collected could be
attributed to this.132*Table 2.3 depicts the most common discrepancies his research
identified. Interestingly, he found that exporters could not prepare the required
documents in compliance with a total of 16 articles of the UCP 500.

1TT

130 Ibid.

m Ibid at 133-134.
132 Ibid at 135-136.
13j Ibid at 136. The UCP 500 Articles that beneficiaries had difficulty meeting were: 12, 23, 24, 25, 27, 31,
33, 34, 35, 36, 39, 40, 42, 4 3 ,4 4 , and 48. The most common frequency o f occurrence o f each discrepancy
consisted overwhelmingly in transport document omitting the capacity o f the signer o f the carrier (337),
which is in violation o f Articles 23, 24, and 27 and the UCP 500. Another frequent discrepancy consisted o f
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Table 2.3 Sakchutchawarn’s Analysis of 500 Internet Websites with Regards to Discrepancies that do
not Comply with the UCP 500
Type

Description of Discrepancy

Failure to comply with
various provisions o f the
UCP (29%).

1. Omitting the capacity o f the signer of
the carrier.
2. Omitting the name o f the carrier.
3. Late presentation.
4. Expiration o f the letter o f credit.
5. Insurance dated after the shipment
date.

Frequency of Occurrence
337
326
255
227
151

In addition, Sakchutchawarn also collected data and classified it according to the
clerical errors committed by exporters and importers in the preparation of documents.
Table 2.4 shows that these errors represented a total of 22 percent of the data collected.134
The errors occurred largely because of human mistake.135 Mistakes included misspellings
and lack of knowledge. An example of one such mistake included the importer spelling
the name as “Sung Jun Electronics Incorporation” instead of “Sung Jin Electronics
Incorporated” as issued in the letter of credit by the bank.136137
The most frequent occurrences of each discrepancy due to clerical errors were the
failure to meet the deadline as required (255), incorrect interpretation of the letter of
credit (241), failure to manage the documents consistently (239), and mismanaging the
shipping term (143).

117

the transport document omitting the name o f the carrier (326), which was in violation o f Articles 23, 24,
and 27. Other frequent discrepancies included: late presentation (255), in violation o f Article 43; expiration
o f the letter o f credit (227), in violation o f Article 42; and the insurance dated after the shipment date (151),
in violation o f Article 34.
™ Ibid at 139-140.
135 Ibid at 140.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid at 140-141.
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Table 2.4 Sakchutchawarn’s Analysis of Discrepancies in 500 Internet Websites with Regards to
Clerical Errors of the Commercial Parties
Type

Description of Discrepancies

Frequency of Occurrence
255

Commercial Party’s Clerical
Errors (22%).

1. Failure to meet deadline
requirements
2. Inaccurate interpretation o f the
L/C
3. Failure to manage the
documents consistently
4. Mismanaging the shipping
terms.

241
239
143

In another study examining the underlying roles of letters of credit, Ronald Mann
personally visited five separate banks to collect data on their letter of credit transactions.
All of the banks were located in the United States; however, he selected institutions of
sufficient variety to get a representation of the industry as a whole: (a) a large US
regional bank headquartered in the Midwest with significant letter of credit transactions;
(b) a mid-sized US regional bank headquartered in the Northeast with significant letter of
credit transactions; (c) a major US domestic bank headquartered in the West with
worldwide letter of credit operations; (d) a major foreign bank, with more than one US
location and with worldwide letter of credit operations; and (e) a major US bank
headquartered in the Northeast with worldwide letter-of-credit operations.
At each bank, information on 100 transactions (fifty “import” transactions, in which
the bank's client was the buyer, and fifty “export” transactions, in which the bank's client
was the seller) were collected.*139 For each transaction, twenty-five data points were
recorded. Among other things, Mann determined whether the presentation conformed to
the letter of credit and, if not, identified where the discrepancies were, and the parties'

1jS Mann, supra note (5) at 2495.
139 Ibid at 2496-2497.
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response to them. He relied entirely on the banks' internal documentation of those
issues. 140
•

The raw data was supplemented by interviews with ten bankers engaged in letter of
credit transactions.140141 Five of the bank officers who supervise the sites that he visited, and
five officers at other banks with substantial letter of credit portfolios (two other large
American banks and three Tokyo-based Japanese banks) were interviewed. 142 Those
interviews explored the significance of discrepancies in letter of credit transactions.
The data revealed a high rate of discrepancy in the presentation of documents by the
beneficiary.143 Specifically, documents only conformed to the letter of credit in 27
percent of the files examined. The conformity rate differed depending on the bank—from
a high of 36 percent to a low of 17 percent. Table 2.5 displays Mann’s findings. 144

140 Ibid at 2497.
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid at 2502.
144 Ibid.
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Table 2.5 Discrepancies Identified by Mann
Type of Defect

Quantity of Defect

Defective Documents

293 (85%)

Missing Documents

75 (22%)

Late Shipment

62 (18%)

Late Presentation

48 (14%)

Expired

36(11% )

Overdraft

16 (5%)

Incorrect Shipment

14 (4%)

Partial Shipment

7 (2%)

Other

2 (1%)

Total Discrepancies

554

Total Discrepant Files

365

Files Not Examined

22

Files Examined

343

The data allowed Mann to reject the suggestion that the high discrepancy rate was due
to hyper technical document examination practices.145 Rather, the discrepancies were due
to more serious problems. For example, 98 of the 343 files (29 percent) that contained
discrepancies were attributed a contractual default by the seller—a failure to comply with
a substantive provision of the letter of credit.146 Furthermore, although problems of the
relative subjectivity arose frequently, a large number of the non-contractual defaults were
of the nature where two reasonable document examiners would not differ.147 For
example, 75 of the presentations (22 percent) did not contain a document required by the
145
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letter of credit; 62 (18 percent) involved a shipment later than the period specified in the
letter of credit; in 48 (14 percent) the beneficiary presented documents late; in 36 (11
percent) the letter of credit had expired; and in 16 (5 percent) the documents sought
payment for an overdraft (an amount that exceeded the balance remaining on the letter of
credit).148
The discrepancies described above, according to Mann, do not suggest a serious
failure of performance by the seller on the underlying sales contract.149 For example, in
201 of the files (59 percent), the defects did not suggest a contractual default by the
beneficiary. The defects in those files, though objectively indisputable problems with the
presentation, did not suggest default because they involved minor documentary
defects.150 Those defects included: inadequate signature on a bill of lading or a technical
inaccuracy in describing the collateral, late presentation (48 files, 14 percent), expiration
(36 files, 11 percent), or overdraft (16 files, 5 percent).151152
By further dividing the transactions into export and import transactions, Mann was
able to discover when the discrepancies occurred. He initially hypothesized that
discrepancies would occur less often on the import side because the beneficiary’s bank
would review the documents before submitting them to the applicant’s bank.

However,

Mann’s data provided contradictory results. He found that 196 out of 250 transactions on
the import side (78 percent) contained discrepancies while 169 out of 250 (68 percent) on
the export side were discrepant.153 On the other hand, of the 169 discrepancies identified

148

Ibid.
Ibid at 2505.
150
Ibid.
151
Ibid.
152 Ibid st 2505-2506.
153 Ibid at 2506.
149

45

by the beneficiary’s banks, the export-side banks obtained complying documents in 68 or
(40 percent) of those 169 files, leaving discrepancies in only 101 files. Accordingly, the
beneficiary’s bank were able to forward documents that complied in 149 (60 percent) of
the 250 transactions.154*
The empirical studies reported by Sakchutchawam and Mann provide a detailed
picture of the problem of non-conforming documents in letter of credit transactions.
Specifically, the high frequency of discrepancies in such transactions put into jeopardy
the use of letters of credit as a finance mechanism in international business transactions.
Further, the data challenges the fundamental theoretical presumptions of the traditional
explanation—documents that strictly conform entitle the beneficiary to absolute
payment—because beneficiaries are overwhelmingly presenting non-conforming
documentation.
VI. An Alternative Explanation: Letters of Credit as “Verification” Instruments
Data shows that beneficiaries present non-conforming documents in the
overwhelming majority of presentations.153 Under the strict compliance doctrine,
followed by the majority of courts in letters of credit transactions in the United States,
this would imply that beneficiaries are not entitled to payment. However, Ronald Mann’s
study shows that despite this high rate of discrepancy, applicants waive the discrepancies
in over 90 percent of the transactions.156 Mann concludes that commercial parties select

154 Ibid.
['5 For published references to the discrepancy story. See Mann supra note 5 at 2503 (his research found
that 73 percent o f the presentations by the seller-beneficiary did not conform); Martin Shaw, Documentary
Credit Insight, Spring 1999 at 11 (who reports that “informed observers” report that 50 percent— some say
up to 60 percent or even up 70 percent o f presentations do not conform); and Vincent M. Maulella,
“Payment Pitfalls for the Unwary: How to Make Your Letter o f Credit Work”, World Trade, (1999) at 76
(American banks report that 50 percent to 60 percent o f presentations are found discrepant on first
presentation.
156 Supra note (5) at 2513-2514.
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letters of credit to finance their transactions because of the “verification” they provide to
the beneficiary with regards to the financial reliability of the applicant.
Mann argues that the traditional explanation for the use of letters of credit does not
fully explain its widespread use. The classic explanation fails in one important respect—
in the overwhelming majority of the data collected the seller did not present conforming
documents. This implies that the seller is not entitled to payment, but rather, just a request
for payment that may be honored if the buyer chooses to waive the discrepancy.
Accordingly, if the seller’s payment relies on the buyer’s willingness to waive the
discrepancy, Mann asks why not use a cheaper alternative instrument instead of letters of
credit.
One would expect from Mann’s findings that applicants would seize upon the
discrepancies and delay or withhold payment to the beneficiary. His study finds,
however, that applicants overwhelmingly waive the discrepancies—even in those cases
where the discrepancy was due to a contractual default—and provide full payment to the
beneficiaries under the letter of credit.157*In the study, Mann found that in the 365 files
with discrepancies, the applicant permitted payment in full in all of them but one. Even
with the one exception, the applicant did not refuse payment, but rather, paid 94 percent
of the agreed amount.

Accordingly, in the 500 files examined, every single beneficiary

was paid. Even in the interviews conducted by Mann, bankers suggested that
beneficiaries were only refused payment in less than one percent of the discrepant files.139
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Applicants also waived the discrepancy rather quickly.160 The bankers interviewed
suggested that applicants would sometimes delay payments to express their
dissatisfaction with the beneficiary’s performance. However, the data collected suggested
otherwise.161162In the 196 import files with discrepancies, the applicant provided a waiver
within one business day after being contacted by the issuing bank in 103 (53 percent) of
the files. After one week of being contacted by the issuing bank, the applicant waived the
discrepancies in 165 (84 percent) of the files. Within four weeks, only six files (3
percent) remained unaccepted.
This led Mann to ask the underlying question of his research: If beneficiaries usually
submit nonconforming documents, which jeopardizes their right to payment under the
letter of credit—but applicants almost always waive the discrepancies, why do
commercial parties pay substantial fees to banks to use letters of credit in their
transactions?
In answering this question, Mann rejects the proposition that business use letters of
credit out of habit.163 He rejects this argument on the basis of the sophistication of the
commercial parties generally involved in the files he examined and the frequency in
which they use letters of credit. Furthermore, businesses have the ability to choose from
other alternative methods of payment—ranging from those most favorable to the seller to
those most favorable to the buyer. These alternatives include: prepayment, payment by
documentary collection, and open account.164
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The available information suggests that parties engaged in commercial transactions
have a wide array of options. Their selection of the letter of credits, therefore, cannot be
attributed as an automatic response to customs in a particular industry. Indeed, Mann
projects that letters of credit are used in one-fifth of cross border activity.165
He then turns to the classical explanation of letters of credit and states this approach
only works if the seller expects to use the letter of credit to force the issuer to pay.166
However, as his data indicates, the seller does not usually present documents that
conform, and accordingly cannot force the issuer to pay. Thus, the seller’s ability to pay
will likely depend on the buyer’s willingness to waive the discrepancy.
Mann accepts a weaker version of the “payment-assurance” method.

Under this

method, he argues that if letters of credit are relatively cheap, and sophisticated sellers
expect buyers to go back on their payment relatively rarely, furthermore, if it is expensive
to present documents that do conform, then sellers may use letters of credit frequently but
accept a high rate of discrepancy, just to keep the letter of credit for those situations
whereby a buyer may refuse payment.169
The rejection of the traditional explanation for the use of letters of credit leads to
Mann’s finding that parties use the letter of credit as a manner to verify that the buyer
will pay.170 Under this approach, the applicant “rents” the issuer’s reputation to allow the
beneficiary to verify the credibility of the applicant. Central to his proposition are the
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availability of reputational sanctions against the bank. Mann assumes that banks have a
strong reputational interest in letter of credit transactions.
To explain why banks provide this type of verifying information, Mann asserts that
sellers cannot assess the reputation of buyers effectively and cheaply.

Distant

geographic location as well as the mere magnitude of buyers makes its costly for sellers
to assess the buyer’s reputation. Such problems are not as significant when assessing the
financial strength and reputability of foreign banks. For one thing, there are not many
banks that engage in letters of credit transactions. Therefore, parties can relatively easily
obtain information about these banks.171273 Secondly, large banks engaged in credit
transactions follow international accounting practices thus rendering easy to assess
information about the buyer’s bank than the buyer itself.174175
Another justification of the verification approach is Mann’s belief that banks
effectively vouch for their customers when they issue letters of credit to them.

That is,

banks screen potential clients before accepting to issue letters of credit to ensure that the
customer is financially solvent. Banks assert something tied more directly to the letter of
credit transaction, likely a general prediction that the buyer will perform according to
industry norms in the letter of credit transaction.176 That prediction—and the commercial
parties' need to get the prediction from the bank—rest on two distinct features of the
issuing bank's relations with the buyer.177 The first of these features is the bank's ability
based on its past interactions with the buyer to assess the buyer's general probity. The
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second is a leverage-related point—the bank's understanding that it can influence the
buyer's behavior on the particular question at issue: the buyer's willingness to waive
discrepancies.

The buyer has the choice of whether to waive a discrepancy or not,

however, it will often disappoint the bank if the buyer rejects documents that include
discrepancies that normally would be waived in the industry in question. If the buyer
knows that the bank will be “disappointed” by the buyer's conduct, the buyer may refrain
from such conduct. From the perspective of the seller, the ability of the bank to influence
the conduct of the overseas buyer might comprise the most important aspect of the letter
of credit.179
Another explanation Mann found for the usage of letters of credit in his study was its
use to indirectly verify the authenticity of international transactions.180 This justification
only made sense when examined in the context in which the requirements appear and
were seen to be quite local. Governments or trading partners indirectly use letters of
credit to indirectly limit the threat of fraudulent or illegal transactions by using the
• • • 1 8 1
position of the beneficiary’s bank, which possesses superior
information.
•

•

•

Thus, the

letter of credit also serves a verification purpose that is; verifying the authentication of
the transaction.
The most common example is a set of governmental controls which appear for those
countries with either a weak local currency or the threat of money laundering justifies
government controls.182 A common method used by those seeking to evade the currency
controls is a fraudulent sales contract in which a party in a currency-restricted state agrees
178
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to purchase goods from a strong-currency country (United States). If the price of the
goods in the underlying sales contract is inflated, this allows the party in a weak-currency
state to move cash out and evade currency controls. This renders it complicated for
government authorities to trace the cash proceeds.183
The requirement of the issuance of a letter of credit in substantial cross-border trade
assists government battling the threat of fraudulent or illegal transactions by providing
the government with an indirect verification of the legitimacy of the transaction. The
rationale behind such practice is that banks will not issue a letter of credit to a party that
is involved in an illegal transaction.184
Mann notes that few countries impose such an absolute requirement.183186Many
countries do, however, use a variety of measures for protecting against such transactions
which lead to the indirect use of letters of credit. For example, governments can use the
letters of credit as a condition before issuing a license in advance of an import or export
transaction.

Further, governments may require a letter of credit when the payment of a

substantial sum of foreign currency is involved.187 Moreover, the letter of credit also can
serve as an instrument whereby overseas trading partners are assured of the availability of
currency to pay for the transaction because banks will not issue a letter of credit without
ensuring that the applicant has obtained the appropriate licenses to allow it to transfer the
currency. 188
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a. Critiques o f Mann’s Study
Mann’s study has been subjected to criticism by various commentators. Clayton
Gillette finds Mann’s “verification” rationale highly plausible and consistent with the
traditional role of letters of credit. Where Gillette disagrees with Mann is placing the
emphasis of explaining the function of letters of credit on what the beneficiary learns
from the issuing bank’s conduct.
Gillette argues that we should be less surprised at the frequency of discrepancy and
less certain of what their existence signifies.190 First, Mann reviewed international
business transactions which were governed by the UCP. The UCP, according to Gillette,
provides for a compliance standard that is not “strict” as in UCC Article 5, but rather, a
requirement that “[cjompliance of the stipulated documents . . . be determined by
international standard banking practice... .”191 Thus, the UCP standard is considerably
more flexible than that of UCC Article 5 which requires that an issuer honor presentation
that on its face strictly comply with the terms and conditions of the letter of credit. An
issuing bank that liberally construes the requirements under the letter of credit risks
upsetting the applicant with whom it has had an ongoing relationship and who in turn
also reimburses the bank. A narrow interpretation of the compliance, on the other hand,
will cause a dispute between the issuing bank and beneficiary. The beneficiary will, of
course, contend that the variations do not constitute discrepancies under the UCP.
Banks would prefer the latter arguments to the former, because banks want to be
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reimbursed from the applicant and are likely to fear the implications to their business
relationship with the applicant.

1 Q-3

In attempting to rebut Mann’s claims and keep with the traditional story, Gillette
states that the letter of credit not only provides the beneficiary with assurance of
payment, but also provides the buyer with parallel insurance—the documents indicate
that the goods it contracted for were shipped.194 It is this aspect of the letter of credit that
makes it beneficial to both parties. Even if there is a discrepancy in the underlying
documents, Gillette states that one would not expect that the great majority of
transactions to be completed without any deviation from expected product quality.195
Mann’s study validates this. His study indicates that the great majority of discrepancies
entail little risk of seller default on the quality of goods underlying the contract.196 As a
matter of fact, departures from the expected product quality are the least discrepancy he
reports. If this is the case, neither the existence nor the honor of discrepant documents
should be surprising. The buyer needs not to insist on strict compliance of the technical
terms of the letter of credit so long as the discrepancy does not entail ultimate delivery of
non-conforming goods.197 From the seller’s perspective, once it has shipped the
conforming goods, there is no need to invest much time in ensuring strict compliance so
long as minor discrepancies can be corrected and documents resubmitted in the rare case
of an insistent buyer.
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Gillette then examines the remarkably high rate of discrepancy that Mann identifies in
his study. He begins by rebutting Mann’s claim that letters of credit issuance provides a
verification of the applicant’s “reliability and probity.”199 Mann assumes that applicants
“rent” the reputation of the bank to provide the beneficiary with information of the
applicant’s credibility that the beneficiary cannot obtain directly. Thus, the letter of credit
is a costly signaling system whereby sellers rely on costly signal to decide with whom to
do business with. There are a number of problems with Mann’s assumptions. In the
standard signaling theory, an intermediary can be used to sort out high quality from low
quality actors in a market that contains participants; but determining where each
participant belongs is very costly ax ante to distinguish for potential traders.200 This
creates a gap for intermediaries to provide the service of screening participants in the
market and separating high quality from low quality actors.

In this sense, banks serve

the certification function that Mann attributes to letters of credit.
In letter of credit transactions, once the beneficiary receives the issuer’s letter of
credit, it is indifferent to applicant’s creditworthiness or ability to pay when the goods are
shipped. This is because of the independence principle which states that the contract
between the buyer and seller is completely separate and independent from the contract
between the beneficiary and issuer.202 Once the credit is issued, it is the issuer to whom
the beneficiary turns to look for payment upon the presentation of complying documents.
The issuer, in turn, is entitled to reimbursement from the applicant.

Mann assumes that

the issuance of the letter is a signal of the buyer’s legitimacy; however, the issuance
199
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renders the buyer’s legitimacy irrelevant because the seller now looks to the issuing bank
for payment. What the issuer provides the beneficiary is not a signal of the buyer’s
credibility, but rather a displacement of the applicant as the primary obligor.204
That is not to say that issuers do not provide any information about the applicant.205
Issuing banks may employ various screening procedures before accepting a customer.
Thus, they may provide beneficiaries a useful service. Such services, however, are largely
by-products of the issuer’s self-interested activity rather than the primary reason for
entering a letter of credit transaction.206*Contrary to Mann’s assumption that banks assist
beneficiaries, Gillette points out that the basis of letter of credit law is the fear of the
beneficiary of collusion between the applicant and issuer at the expense of the
beneficiary.

This explains why waivers and estoppels have emerged to deal with the

zealous protection of applicants by the issuing banks at the expense of customers.208
Another shortcoming of Mann’s hypothesis is the fact that the letter of credit is a
relatively poor system of providing information.209*Specifically, the issuance of a letter of
credit does not make a distinction between the applicant who barely qualifies and those
whose standing is beyond reproach. Furthermore, the letter of credit is an expensive
signaling device.

Gillette states that there are other alternatives that would be cheaper

than using letters of credit to signal information.211
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The availability of reputational sanctions requires two conditions to be fulfilled.212
First, those who deal with parties whose reputation is at stake must be able to
communicate information about misbehavior.213 Second, prospective customers who
would benefit from the information must be able to receive it.214 In Mann’s context,
however, sellers are as numerous as buyers. Moreover, within the same industry, the
same firms that are buyers in one transaction are likely to be sellers in another. Mann’s
study fails to explain how frustrated beneficiaries will impose sanctions on opportunistic
banks.215*21789
Gillette then turns to the methodology pursued by Mann. He argues that in general
lawyers are not adequately trained to perform empirical studies.

He does not say much

about the design of Mann’s study but proposes that Mann’s research entails additional
hypotheses.

Among these additional hypotheses is testing whether buyers and sellers

who have a continuing relationship continue to use letters of credit or not. According to
Mann’s findings, one should find a decrease in the use of letters of credit between trading
partners who have had previous course of dealings because the information asymmetries
is not present. 218
•

Finally, Gillette raises the concern that Mann’s study may be biased.

Mann

generates his information about the rationale of buyers and sellers by interviewing
bankers on the telephone. The evidence he obtains should not be surprising considering
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the group whom he selected.

990

•

.

His findings indicate that banks provide useful

information in the commercial world. The problem is that such sources are more likely to
make such assertions of the role of their financial institutions. It would have been more
appropriate for Mann to have interviewed all the parties involved in the letter of credit
transaction—the applicants and beneficiaries—to provide for a complete picture as to
why the various parties choose the letter of credit.221
Avery Katz also argues that Mann’s account of letters of credit is incomplete.222 In
particular, Katz argues that Mann’s explanation fails to explain why commercial parties
contracting at a distance would want to use a letter of credit as their mechanism for
verifying information related to the transaction, as opposed to some other cheaper
alternative.

Further, he asserts that Mann fails to explain why if the letter of credit is

used by commercial parties to signal the buyer’s reliability, they would avoid making the
signal stronger by making the letter of credit legally enforceable.

Therefore, Katz

argues that Mann’s “verification” explanation fails to explain all of the facts his empirical
study has uncovered.225
Mann’s explanation is incomplete because he focused on only half of the problem
present in a letter of credit transaction.226 Both the buyer and seller face various risks
when engaging in an international business transaction. The seller faces the risk of
shipping the goods and the buyer not paying. Meanwhile, the buyer is concerned that it
will pay for goods that do not conform to the quantity, quality, and description agreed
220
221
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upon. These risks can be eliminated by either party by insisting that the other party
perform first.

For example, the seller can insist that the buyer pre-pay, or the buyer can

insist that the seller ship on open account.

Such insistence by either party, however,

will give less protection to one of the parties.*28229 Further, it is crucial to understand that no
arrangement can provide complete assurance to both parties. The difficulty lies in the fact
that both parties are located at a distance, which renders it difficult for them to perform
simultaneously.230
Ultimately, Katz finds that Mann omits that the commercial letter of credit is a
bilateral assurance mechanism; an approach that divides the difference between pre
payment and shipment on open account. When the bilateral nature of risk involved in
international business transactions is taken into account, the use of letters of credit, as
well as the fact that they are honored in the majority of presentation despite non
conforming presentation, becomes more understandable.23123
Katz concludes that Mann’s study is ultimately incomplete for two reasons.

By

focusing on the seller’s need for information regarding the buyer’s financial solvency,
Mann ignores the buyer’s need to verify the seller’s reliability to produce and ship the
goods contracted for.

Second, Katz argues that Mann presents the need for verification

as an alternate and mutually exclusive explanation for the traditional account of letter of
credit.234 As will be recalled, the traditional account emphasizes the secure and prompt
payment assurance. Mann fails to recognize how verification and payment operate in
221 Ibid.
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practice in a complementary manner rather than as substitutes. Specifically, the fact that
letters of credit are usually non-conforming, which renders them legally unenforceable,
does not mean legal enforceability is not an important part of their commercial value.
While Mann’s study has been subjected to various criticisms, it remains the leading
empirical study on letters of credit. His collection of data from 500 letters of credit
transactions in the US provides a glimpse of how sophisticated commercial parties use
the instrument. Specifically, his data details the nature and frequency of the discrepancies
commonly found in letters of credit. His findings—the high rate of discrepancies and the
applicants’ waivers of the discrepancies—led him to propose an alternative explanation
for the use of letters of credit.
Mann’s data will be utilized throughout this dissertation because it is the most
comprehensive empirical study in the field. The author recognizes the critiques of his
study, but is also aware of its ability to provide significant insight into the practices of
commercial parties engaging in letters of credit transactions.235

235 Ibid.
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CHAPTER THREE
STANDARDS OF COMPLIANCE
I. Introduction
Under the letter of credit regime, a beneficiary is required to submit documents that
comply with the terms and conditions of the letter of credit. Upon submitting conforming
documents, the beneficiary is entitled to absolute payment from the issuing bank. Various
studies, however, demonstrate that beneficiaries are not submitting conforming
documentation in the overwhelming majority of letter of credit transactions. This chapter
provides the reader with a solid background of the various standards of compliance that
courts in the United States have applied in letter of credit transactions. The issue of which
particular standard the author recommends courts should adopt in letter of credit
transactions is outlined in Chapter 4.
The issue of compliance has not been without controversy in the United States. In the
absence of precedents by the United States Supreme Court, state supreme courts, and
state legislatures, federal courts have been placed into the forefront of defining the
appropriate standard of compliance in letter of credit transactions. Courts have responded
to this task by formulating three distinct standards of compliance—strict, substantial, and
the bifurcated standard.
Unfortunately, courts have not been uniform in their application of the standards of
compliance. New York, the forerunner in letter of credit law, has applied both the strict
compliance and the bifurcated standard at various times.

Further, diverse

2j6 In Beyene v Irving Trust Company, 762 F Supp (2d) 4 (SD NY 1985) the United States Courts o f
Appeals for the Second District applied the strict compliance standard. In Transamerica Delaval v
Citibank, NA, 545 F Supp 200 (SD NY 1982) the United States District Court applied the bifurcated
standard.
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interpretations of strict compliance have emerged in the various American jurisdictions.
Some courts have followed a mirror image, or literal application of the rule, and others
have provided for a more reasonable approach.237 This failure on the part of the courts
has led to uncertainty and confusion on the part of commercial parties as well as banks.
Both remain unsure as to how a court may rule on a particular transaction.
The objective of this chapter is to define, explain, and describe how US have
interpreted the various standards of compliance. Accordingly, this chapter will begin by
defining the strict compliance standard. This particular standard requires the sellerbeneficiary to present documents that match the terms of the letter of credit word-forword. Thus, any discrepancy provides the issuing bank with sufficient reason to refuse to
honor presentation on the part of the seller-beneficiary. An analysis of four cases from
various US jurisdictions demonstrates the evolution of the strict compliance standard.
Specifically, the analysis is meant to illustrate the inability of the judiciary to provide
commercial parties and banks with a clear uniform approach.
Further, an examination of the substantial standard of compliance is undertaken. This
standard is the primary rival to the strict compliance standard and is applied in a minority
of American jurisdictions. Jurisdictions that have chosen to apply this standard tend to do
so because of their concern with equity. Courts in these jurisdictions tend to be concerned
with the results achieved with the rigid application of strict compliance and have sought
to remedy the occasional harsh consequences of its application. Thus, this chapter will
look at how substantial compliance has been defined and applied by various jurisdictions.
2j7 See: (1) Hanil Bank v Pt. Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero), 2000 WL 254007 (SD NY 2000); (2)
Beyene v Irving Trust Co, 762 F Supp (2d) 4 (SD NY 1985); (3) New Braunfels Nat. Bank v Odiorne, 780
SW (2d) 313 (TX App Ct 1989); (4) Dubose Steel, Inc v Branch Banking and Trust Co, 324 SE (2d) 859
(NC App Ct 1985); and (5) Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp v Bank o f China, 167 F Supp (2d) 940 at 947
(SD Tex 2000).
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This will be achieved by analyzing various cases. The purpose of this analysis of case law
is to gain a comparative framework between substantial and strict compliance standards.
Further, an objective criticism of substantial compliance is provided.
Finally, an analysis of the bifurcated standard is carried out. The bifurcated standard
is an approach taken by some courts that adopt either strict compliance or substantial
compliance; depending upon whom was being sued. Thus, if the beneficiary seeks to sue
an issuing bank, courts apply strict compliance. If, however, the applicant sues the
issuing bank, then courts apply substantial compliance. The underlying rationale of this
approach is based upon the assumption that issuing banks act in good faith when
dishonoring the presentation of a beneficiary. Meanwhile, by applying a substantial
compliance standard, courts assume that they provide issuing banks protection from the
potential bad faith practices of applicants who may refuse to reimburse an issuing bank.
Accordingly, the analysis of the cases will be pursued in order to determine how and why
courts have implemented this standard in various factual circumstances.
Another objective of this chapter is to gain a fundamental understanding of how
judicial courts have interpreted various discrepancies. This is crucial to the overall
objective of the dissertation because of the potential significance this may have on
discrepancies and the functioning of the letter of credit regime. In Chapter 4, the author
recommends the appropriate standard needed to ensure the functioning of the letter of
credit transactions. Therefore, knowledge of the various standards and how courts have
interpreted them is crucial.
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II. The Standards of Compliance
American jurisdictions have applied various standards of compliance. Some
jurisdictions, such as New York, have applied two different standards. This section will
explore the various standards.
a. The Strict Compliance Standard
The modem definition of strict compliance can be traced to ViscountSumner’s
statement in Equitable Trust v Dawson Partners,238*In that case he stated “there is no
room for documents which are almost the same or which will do just as well.”

Such a

statement implies that courts are well-suited for the task of determining which documents
are the same or almost the same.240 American courts, however, have struggled to
formulate effective guidelines for the determination of the general principle expressed by
Viscount Sumner. This failure may partially be attributed to the fact that the
determination of which documents are the same, or almost the same, requires specialized
knowledge of banking practices.241
The ambiguity of what constitutes strict compliance has resulted injudicial activism.
The explosion of litigation in the 1970s resulted in many contradictory versions of strict
compliance. This has created confusion and uncertainty among bankers and banking
lawyers. What has emerged from the courts’ attempts of formulating rules for everyday
banking operations has threatened the viability of letters of credit as an effective and
secure finance mechanism.242 Furthermore, the inability to form a uniform definition of
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strict compliance has allowed for its abuse and the emergence of various exceptions to

The uncertainty of the judicial meaning of strict compliance and the fear of being held
liable has led bankers to adopt highly defensive practices.2
43244 This may partially explain
why such a high percentage of documents presented by seller-beneficiaries are found to
be discrepant.245 While the discrepancies are mostly cured or waived by the buyerapplicant, the widespread rejection of the initial presentation has resulted in high
transactional and operational costs.246247The process of documentation review and
corrections tends to be a labor intensive task. Moreover, because banks must keep the
costs of letters of credit inexpensive enough to encourage customers and beneficiaries to
rely on banks as their financial intermediaries, the labor costs are not always covered by
the commissions or fees.

94.7

Revised Article 5 of the UCC states that strict compliance is the appropriate standard
of compliance in letter of credit transactions.248 It rejects the mirror-image strict
compliance approach stating that conformity must not be “slavish” or oppressive
perfectionism.249 Article 5 requires... “observe [the] standard practice of financial
institutions that regularly issue letters of credit.”250 Determining what that practice is,
however, is not always an easy task because standard practice may be written or oral,
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local or regional, and vary from location to location.251 According to Article 5, standard
practice is:
(i) International practice set forth in or referenced by the Uniform Customs and
Practice, (ii) other practice rules published by associations of financial
institutions, and (iii) local and regional practice. It is possible that standard
practice will vary from one place to another. Where there are conflicting
practices, the parties should indicate which practice governs their rights.252

To further complicate matters, the Official Comment makes clear that “standard
practice” may not be very standard at all.253 It is apparent that issuing banks cannot draw
specific lines as to what strict compliance is and accordingly must use their discretion in
making decisions as to whether the presentation conforms. This disturbing reality is
limited by the issuing bank’s obligation to act in good faith, which will be discussed in
Chapter Four.
Proponents of the strict compliance standard argue that it facilitates the functioning of
letters of credit.254 Large banks with letter-of-credit departments have employees whose
job is to review the credit documents by comparing them with the terms of the letter
itself. These document reviewers also apply rules from the UCP and UCC to which many
credits are subjected to.255 The bankers are thus appropriately trained in the field and
know, or should know, banking customs and usage. With the use of the strict compliance
standard these bankers can quickly examine the documents and drafts submitted by the
beneficiary and easily compare them to the terms and conditions put forth in the letter of
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credit. Such an examination is quick and cheap to do.

After quickly comparing the

documents and the letter of credit, the banker can promptly dispense payment if the
presented documents strictly comply. This procedure also provides reassurance to the
beneficiary who knows that so long as the presented documents strictly conform to the
terms of the credit, then payment is assured.257 Any alternative that fails to deliver this
form of prompt payment for the beneficiary may render the beneficiary less willing to do
business with the applicant. Thus, by adopting a strict compliance standard, issuing banks
assist in the facilitation of international business transactions among private parties.
i. The Evolution of Strict Compliance Case Law
The following analysis presents the evolutionary development of the strict
compliance standard in the United States. This storyline demonstrates that courts have
flip-flopped from the initial mirror-image approach taken by the court in Beyene v Irving
Trust Co to a ’’modified” strict compliance approach represented by Voest-Alpine Trading
USA Corp v Bank o f China, then back to a “mirror-image” approach as represented by
Hanil Bank v PT Negara Indonesia.

The result of this inconsistency has been

confusion, uncertainty, and the likely possibility of rising costs for letters of credit.
Beyene v Irving Trust Co, involved the misspelling of one of the commercial parties
in a letter of credit.

The court was confronted with the issue of whether such a

misspelling was a material discrepancy which justified the confirming bank’s refusal to
pay the beneficiary.
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The case involved Beyene attempting to sell two prefabricated homes to Mohammad
Sofan, a resident of the Yemen Arab Republic. Sofan attempted to finance the purchase
by obtaining a letter of credit from the Yemen Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(YBRD) in favor of Beyene. YBRD appointed Irving as the confirming bank in the US
and Irving subsequently informed Beyene of the document requirements. Beyene
meanwhile designated the National Bank of Washington (NBW) as its collecting bank.
NBW sent Irving the documents required under the letter of credit. Irving, however,
notified NBW that there were several discrepancies in the documents submitted,
including the fact that the bill of lading listed the party to be contacted by the shipping
company as Mohammad “Soran” instead of Mohammad “Sofan.”

Irving requested the

discrepancy be waived by the issuing bank, however, no waiver was granted.
The court stated that an issuing bank, or a confirming bank, has an absolute duty to
pay a beneficiary the amount stated in the letter of credit so long as the documents
submitted by the beneficiary comply with the terms of the letter of credit.264 Moreover,
in order to protect the confirming bank from liability, the documents submitted must
strictly comply with the terms of the letter of credit.

cc

The court went on to state that while some variations in the bill of lading may be
insignificant that it may relieve the confirming bank from paying the beneficiary; in the
present case the misspelling of “Sofan” as “Soran” was determined to be a material
discrepancy.

In particular, the misspelling was not a case whereby the name intended
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was clear despite a typographical error, such as where “Smith” might be misspelled as
“Smithh.” Furthermore, it was not proven that in the Middle East the name “Soran” was
generally recognized to be the misspelling of the surname of Sofan.

Moreover, Sofan

was to be given notice of the arrival of the goods and the misspelling could have resulted
in the non-arrival of the goods.268* Consequently, the court found the misspelling to be a
material discrepancy in the presentation which justified Irving from paying.
In New Braunfels National Bank v Odiorne, the Texas Court of Appeals was
confronted with the issue of how strict a beneficiary must comply with the terms and
conditions stated in a letter of credit.
Southern International Insurance Company (Southern) requested that New Braunfels
National Bank (Bank) issue a letter of credit for the amount of $250,000 payable to
Bates, the Superintend of an insurance company in the Cayman Islands. The Bank
agreed to issue the letter based upon several conditions including: (1) the execution by
Southern of a $250,000 promissory note, (2) assignment to the bank of a security interest
of certain property belonging to Southern, and (3) depositing compensating balance of
$250,000 against which the bank could exercise a right of set-off in the event that the
Bank ever had to fund the letter of credit.270
The Bank issued an irrevocable letter of credit number 86-122-S. The “86”
represented the year in which it was issued; the “122” was the numerical sequence of all
credits ever issued by the Bank regardless of the year; and the “S” indicated that it was a
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standby letter of credit.271 The sole condition of the letter was that any draft be marked as
follows: “Drawn under New Braunfels National Bank Irrevocable Letter of Credit 86122-S.”272 The expiry date of the letter of credit was April 29, 1987.
On April 29, 1987, a representative of Bates submitted to the Bank a draft signed by
Bates and the original letter of credit. After examining the submitted documents, the
Bank refused to honor the letter claiming the existence of a discrepancy. Specifically, the
submitted draft’s legend referred to “Irrevocable Letter of Credit 86-122-5” instead of
“86-122-S.”273 The Bank refused to allow Bates’ representatives to change the “5” to “S”
without written authorization from Bates. When Bates attempted to provide such
instructions by wire, the wire was misdirected and did not arrive to the Bank. Bates
mailed written instructions, however, the instructions arrived several days later and the
Bank refused to honor claiming that the letter had expired.

974

The court acknowledged that most courts have adopted the strict compliance test
when dealing with letters of credit.273* The court stated that strict compliance does not
demand “oppressive perfectionism.”276 The court noted a distinction between
discrepancies that relate to the business of the underlying transaction and those that relate
to the banker’s own business.277
The court went on to provide two cases which exemplified “noncommercial”
defects.

In Tosco Corp v FDIC, the credit required that a draft on the credit contain the
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following legend: “drawn under Bank of Clarksville Letter of Credit Number 105.”

The bank, however, refused to honor the draft because the legend (1) added the word
“Tennessee” after “Clarksville”, (2) used a lower case “1” in the term “letter of Credit”
and (3) abbreviated “Number” as “No.”280*In First Bank v Paris Saving and Loan Corp,
the credit required that the draft contain the following legend: “"Drawn under Paris
Savings and Loan Association Letter of Credit No. 1033."

The bank refused to honor

because the legend contained the following: "Drawn under Paris Savings and Loan
Association Letter of Credit No. 1033, dated June 12, 1986, i/a/o $ 250.000.”282283In both
these cases, however, the beneficiary prevailed.
The court adopted Professor John Dolan’s reasoning that strict compliance does not
require the banker to know the commercial impact of the discrepancy.

Thus, a bank

does not need to know whether dried grapes are the same as raisins or that “C.R.S.”
stands for Coromandel ground nuts.284 It noted that in almost every case where the
discrepancy was a commercial one, the issuer had prevailed in Texas. Further, in virtually
every recent case where the discrepancy was a non-commercial, the beneficiary had
prevailed.285
With regards to the discrepancy in the underlying case, the court declared that this
may or may not have been material by itself.286 However, the draft was accompanied by
the original letter of credit which prominently displayed the accurate letter of credit
number. Accompanying documents, according to the court, may be used to determine
279
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whether the presentment made by the beneficiary strictly complies with the letter of
credit.287*
The court concluded that its ruling does not imply that a beneficiary may satisfy non•

commercial conditions through a “substantial compliance” standard.

ooo

Strict compliance

remained the appropriate standard. Strict compliance, however, may mean less than
•

absolute perfect compliance.

98Q

The Official Comment to Article 5 of the UCC adopts the reasoning of the court in
New Braunfels. It states that: “Strict compliance does not mean slavish conformity to the
terms of the letter of credit.”290*
Boris Kozolchyk has criticized the decision in New Braunfels Nat Bank v Odiorne.
Specifically, he argues that issuing banks should not be forced into the position of
“determining whether a documentary discrepancy is significant.”

Kozolchyk argues

that issuing banks and confirming banks must first of all determine the significance of the
various documents for each credit issuance. It is from this examination where the
evaluation of the seriousness of the discrepancy is examined.

Only after such a process

does the issuing or confirming bank discharge its duty of reasonable care. Furthermore,
because discrepancies are the norm, and not the exception, a bank’s mission is to act as a
reasonable and diligent payer, and not as a party seeking reason not to pay. Accordingly,
issuing banks must differentiate among the discrepancies it may find in the submitted
documents.293
287
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The Texas Court of Appeals in New Braunfels adopted the erroneous rationale that
“the reason for the strict rule is to protect the issuer from having to know the commercial
impact of a discrepancy in the document.”294*Kozolchyk argues that document checkers
need to learn to distinguish between the various types of documents that may be
submitted by the beneficiary on the basis of their letter of credit and underlying
transactional functions.

For example, the checker must comprehend that “air and sea

waybills as well as mates receipts, even though members of the same family of transport
documents as the bill of lading, cannot discharge the latter’s function of a negotiable
document of title.”296
After learning to identify the type and function, the checker must learn the
commercial effect that each condition in the letter of credit possesses, for example
“shipping terms FOB Vancouver.”297 Such information is both of banking and a
commercial nature. It pertains to banking because it allows the bank to verify whether
compliance with the credit terms was achieved. It pertains to non-banking trade when it
reflects what the buyer-applicant lists as the payment’s terms and conditions.298
Ultimately, Kozolchyk’s rejects the New Braunfels court rationale and asserts that
banking and commercial information are both absolutely necessary to ensure the
underlying purpose of the transaction and to verify strict compliance.299
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1. Voest-Alpine: a “Common Sense, Case-by-Case
Approach”
Various courts have moved away from the mirror-image strict compliance
standards.300301These districts have been driven by a more rational approach that does not
focus on the hypertechnical, word-for-word compliance, but rather, an approach that
allows for minor deviations of a typographical nature. Among the most important of these
decisions has been the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
decision in Voest-Alpine whereby the court adopted a “common sense, case-by-case
approach” which allows for minor deviations of a typographical nature.

The court’s

reasoning was based upon its belief that a word-by-word correspondence between the
letter of credit and the other required documents is almost impossible. The court opted to
select the “modified” strict compliance standard which is a common-sense approach that
looks to the entire documents and whether they clearly relate to the transaction on their
face.302
Voest-Alpine entered a contract with Jiangyin Foreign Trade Corporation (“JFTC”) to
sell 1,000 metric tons styrene monomer for the total price of $1.2 million.303 To finance
the transaction JFTC applied for a letter of credit through the Bank of China branch in

j0° See Cont’l Cas Co v Southtrust BankN.A, 933 So 2d 337 at 342 (Ala Supreme Ct 2006), where the
Alabama Supreme Court stated that the UCP 500 art 14 did not require an address for the beneficiary on the
draft presented. Another example o f a court granting leniency to a financial institution is Blonder & Co Inc
v Citibank N.A, 28 AD 3d 180 at 181, 808 NYS 2d 214 at 216 (2006) where the New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, where the court held that the (1) the UCP governed the transaction, (2) the plaintiffs
expert testimony o f what international banking standard does or does not require was irrelevant, and (3)
Citibank was justified in honoring the presentation even though the documents contained several
discrepancies, including (a) the bill o f lading did not designate a consignee, (b) conflicting dates, and (c)
conflicting ports o f loading because such documents appeared on their face to substantially comply with the
terms in the letter o f credit.
301 Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp v Bank o f China, 167 F Supp (2d) 940 at 947 (SD Tex 2000), a ff d, 288
F3d 262 (S* Cir 2002).
302 Ibid.
303 Ibid at 942.
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New York. The letter of credit stated that payment would be issued when the goods were
sent to a particular port in China. The letter of credit was assigned the number
“LC9521033/95.” Furthermore, the UCP 500 was incorporated into the letter.304
The letter of credit had various typographical mistakes. First, Voest-Alpine’s was
listed as “Voest-Alpine USA Trading Corp.” instead of “Voest-Alpine Trading USA
Corp.” The destination port was also misspelled in one place as “Zhangiagng” missing
the third “a”.305*
When the products were ready to ship, market prices had dropped and JFTC sought a
price concession.

Voest-Alpine refused to grant one and proceeded to ship the goods.

All required inspections and documents were completed and Voest-Alpine subsequently
presented the required documents to Texas Commerce Bank, the presenting bank. The
presenting bank found various discrepancies and informed Voest-Alpine of them.
Voest-Alpine believed such discrepancies were not substantial and requested that the
presenting bank forward it to Bank of China.308
The Bank of China telexed seven alleged discrepancies to the presenting bank.309 The
Bank of China claimed: 1) the beneficiary's name differed from the name listed in the
letter of credit; 2) Voest-Alpine had submitted bills of lading marked "duplicate" and
"triplicate" instead of "original"; 3) the invoice, packing list, and the certificate of origin
were not marked "original"; 4) the date of the survey report was later than that of the bill
of lading; 5) the letter of credit number in the beneficiary's certified copy of the fax was
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incorrect; and 6) the destination was not listed correctly in the certificate of origin and the
•

•

.

'l I A

beneficiary's certificate, as noted by the presenting bank.

Communication between both banks ensued whereby the presenting bank wrote to
Bank of China that it could not refuse payment to Voest-Alpine.

Meanwhile, Bank of

China argued that it could not pay Voest-Alpine because the documents tendered to it did
not comply with the letter of credit requirements. Attempts by Voest-Alpine to get JFTC
to waive the discrepancies were unsuccessful.
In its discussion of the appropriate compliance standard, the court stated that prior to
1999 Texas did not follow the strict compliance approach. Rather they only required that
the documents presented on their face “appeared to comply” with the letter of credit.
The current statutory requirement, however, required that the issuing bank must honor
presentation, as determined by financial practice of institutions engaged in the issuance of
letters of credit, so long as it appears on its face to strictly comply with the conditions of
the letter. The determination of what constitutes the “standard practice of financial
institutions” is left to the courts.314
Voest-Alpine argued for the adoption of a “functional standard” of compliance
whereby the court examines the whole documents to determine whether they comply with
the transaction. Bank of China alleged that the discrepancies were material and therefore
did not strictly comply with the letter of credit conditions.
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In examining the relevant law under UCP 500, the court noted that the UCP 500 does
not provide guidance on what inconsistencies would justify a bank in concluding that the
documents were not in compliance with the terms and conditions of the letter.
However, the UCP 500 did not require a mirror image of the requirements of strict
compliance.317
The court recognized that courts have different interpretations of the numerous
compliance standards.

Even those jurisdictions that adhere to the strict compliance do

not have a uniform approach. The court stated that “a common sense, case-by-case
approach would permit minor deviations of a typographical nature because such a letterfor-letter correspondence between the letter of credit and the presentation of documents is
virtually impossible.319” Essentially, the court adopted a common-sense approach
whereby a bank is required to examine “whether the whole of the documents obviously
relate to the transaction on their face.

”

In its ruling, the court departed from Beyene ’s reasoning and also rejected the
Odiorne ’s standard by holding that the issuing bank “is not required to evaluate risks or
go beyond the face of the documents” when determining if tendered documents strictly
comply with the letter of credit.321 Upon examining the documents presented as a whole
and realizing the addresses were identical in both the letter of credit and submitted
documents, the court reasoned that the beneficiary’s submitted documents “bore obvious
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319 Ibid.
320 Ibid.
321
Kylie Roane, “Hanil Bank v PT Bank Negara Indoesia (Persero): Continuing the Quandary of
Documentary Compliance under International Letter o f Credit” (2004) 41 Hous L Rev 1053 at 1069.

77

links” to the letter of credit because the fact that they stated the same address did not
signify a different corporation.
Finally, the court rejected the issuing bank’s claim of non-compliance with respect to
the numbering of the letter of credit and the listing of the destination port after examining
the document with its common-sense approach.3
2323 This approach is a practice-oriented
one which utilizes modem banking practices and procedures. Ultimately, the value of this
approach is that it recognizes the innocent typographical errors in identifying the same
things.
Though the court appeared to depart from the Beyene’s reasoning it actually rejected
the Odiorne’s analysis by stating that the issuing bank “is not required to evaluate risks or
go beyond the face of the documents” when determining when the documents presented
strictly comply with the letter of credit.324
2. Hand: Back to Square One
Very shortly after Voest-Alpine, the US District Court for the Southern District of
New York decided Hanil Bank v PTNegara Indonesia.3253
6It has been used as an example
2
of how courts can misapply the strict compliance standard by failing to judge each of the
individual document’s significance as utilized in the letter of credit transaction.
Hanil, a South Korean banking corporation, brought suit against BNI on the grounds
of breach of contract, breach of the UCP, unjust enrichment, and breach of implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.327 The case involved Kodeco, a firm applying
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for a letter a credit to be issued for the benefit of “Sung Jun Electronics” (Sung Jun) for
the amount of $170,995.

BNI, however, misspelled the beneficiary’s name as “Sung

Jin Electronics Co. Ltd.” The beneficiary did not request that its name be corrected and
sold the letter of credit and the documents from Sung Jun.329 Later; Hand submitted the
required documents including a draft, commercial invoice, bill of lading, insurance
policy, a packing list, and a fax advice to BNI for payment. BNI, however, rejected the
documents and refused to pay.330* BNI alleged that it compared the documents to the
letter of credit and found several discrepancies, most significant among them; the name
of the beneficiary in the letter of credit was spelled “Sung Jun Electronics Co. Ltd.” and
not “Sung Jin.”

Hand contended that it contacted Kodeco and asked it to waive the

discrepancies, however, Kodeco declined.332
According to the court, a beneficiary must submit documents that strictly comply
with the letter of credit requirements.33j This means that the bill of ladings, bill of
exchange, and insurance documents, must exactly match those stated in the letter of
credit.334 The court noted that under the strict compliance rule, some variations may be so
insignificant as to relieve the issuing or confirming bank of its obligation to pay. The
court cited Beyene and the misspelling of “Smith” as “Smithh” as an example of what is
obviously a typographical error.333
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Applying its test to the facts of the case, the court found that the misspelling of “Sung
Jun” as “Sung Jin” was similar to the misspelling of “Sofan” as “Soran” in Beyene.336*
Following the Beyene rationale, the court concluded that it was not unmistakenably clear
that the misspelling was a typographical error. Thus, the court determined that it
amounted to a significant error.
The court rejected Hanil’s attempt to distinguish the facts of the case from Beyene.
Specifically, it stated that the Second Circuit in Beyene had made it clear that under letter
of credit law “the beneficiary must inspect the letter of credit and is responsible for any
negligent failure to discover that the credit does not achieve the desired commercial
ends.”339 The beneficiary is in the best position to determine whether a letter of credit
meets the needs of the underlying commercial transaction and to request any necessary
changes...” It is more efficient to require the beneficiary to conduct that review of the
credit before the fact of performance than after it, and the beneficiary that performs
without seeing or examining the credit should bear the costs.”340 Accordingly, the court
found that BNI properly rejected the documents submitted by Hand because the
misspelling was a significant error and granted summary judgment in favor of BNI.341
The Hanil decision was premised on the application of a formalistic mirror-image
application of the strict compliance standard. The court’s justification that the misspelled
name was not obviously recognizable is of little use and has been argued to have only
perpetuated the confusion of documentary compliance. Moreover, the court’s use of case
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law rather than the UCP implies that it did not allow expert testimony regarding whether
the beneficiaries’ name was an obvious error in the parties’ countries of origin—Korea
and Indonesia. In addition, the court’s examination of the documents also skipped over
the matching addresses in the letter of credit issued and the documents tendered under the
letter of credit. Had the court applied a more rigid examination of the documents tendered
and the letter of credit, it may have reconsidered whether the misspelling was actually an
obvious typographical error.
The Hanil court has been criticized for applying the mirror-image interpretation of
strict compliance.342 The court failed to draw the important distinction between
commercial invoices and other documents for compliance purposes and consequently
placed itself in an analysis whereby all documents submitted which do not exactly
replicate the terms of the letter of credit are deemed to be discrepant.343
The court’s decision also reveals that the flawed logic of Beyene has not been
overcome.344 The court misapplied the strict compliance standard by failing to recognize
the difference in the significance of each documents submitted. Specifically, the court
failed to distinguish between the required level of precision of documentary compliance
under the UCP for commercial invoices and that required for other documents.345 The
court held that because the letter of credit contained the name “Sung Jun” and the
documents submitted contained the name “Sung Jin,” the documents were discrepant and
the issuing bank had the right to dishonor.346
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ii. Summary o f Strict Compliance
It has been alleged that the application of a mirror-image interpretation of strict
compliance encourages opportunities for bad faith behavior on part of the issuing bank
who may decide to refuse payment based upon minor discrepancies such as missing
commas or asterisks.347 Further, applying the mirror-image interpretation tips the balance
in favor of applicants and against beneficiaries.348 Finally, such an interpretation also
fosters mistrust between an applicant and beneficiary and also among correspondent
banks, acting as advising, confirming, negotiating, paying or reimbursing banks.349
The line of cases above demonstrates that courts have failed to establish a uniform
approach to the strict compliance standard. This failure has led to the existence of various
divergent standards which only increases investment uncertainty. The absence of
guidance from the US Supreme Court, as well as state supreme courts, and state
legislatures has allowed for the creation of a fertile field whereby courts have toiled with
finding the optimum standard of strict compliance. Unfortunately this toiling has led to
confusion and inconsistency in the field of letters of credit.
b. Substantial Compliance
The prominent rival to strict compliance is the substantial compliance standard. This
standard was established by courts who were concerned with the negative outcomes that
resulted from the application of strict compliance.350 Judges adopting substantial
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compliance were largely reacting to the “hypertechnical” insistence by issuing banks that
every “i” be dotted and every “t” be crossed. Thus, judges looked to what they deemed to
be “fair” when resolving allegations of wrongful payment.351352Courts have accepted
deviation from the literal terms and conditions of the letter of credit by asking the
following: “whether the deviation creates an uncertainty in the document checker’s mind
as to an essential aspect of the document checker’s verification”; or they may ask
“whether the discrepancy misled the document checker into thinking that there was
compliance with the credit”; or whether the discrepancy misled the document checker to
the document checker’s detriment.332
Courts that have applied substantial compliance tend to be drawn to what they see to
be “fair.” One court has described substantial compliance as “some leaven in the loaf of
strict construction.” Another court has applied substantial compliance in response to what
it viewed as the bank’s attempt to “palter with justice” by scrutinizing the beneficiary’s
documents and raising a “hypertechnical argument.”
i. Substantial Compliance Case Law
The following line of cases demonstrates various factual circumstances which have
been litigated in various jurisdictions that have applied the substantial compliance
standard. They are meant to provide a better understanding of why courts apply the
standard, as well as the rationale of the standard.
In Banco Espanol the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
decided whether a domestic bank whose letters of credit, as amended, called for the
presentation of an inspection certificate by a named firm stipulating “that the goods are in

j51 Dolan, supra note (16) at 24.
352 Kozolchyk, supra note (34) at 67.
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conformity with the order”, was justified in refusing to honor the drafts of Banco Espanol
on the ground that the inspection certificate did not meet the terms of the letter of
credit.353
State Street, a domestic bank in the United States, on behalf of its customer, Robert
Lawrence, issued two irrevocable letters of credit for the purchase of various garments.
Both letters made Banco Espanol the advising bank. They also required signed invoices,
customs invoices, inspection certificates, and full sets of clean on board ocean bills of
lading dated no later than March 31, 1963.354*
At the time of the issuance of the letters, State Bank warned its customer of the
various risks of the inspection certificate without naming a specific inspector. Lawrence’s
response was that the letters would be subsequently amended to include a name of an
.

.

inspection agent.

355

The next several months were dedicated to resolving this problem.356 After various
arrangements, it was settled that the letters of credit were to be amended to name
Supervigilancia Sociedad de Control S.A. (Supervigiliancia) as responsible to certify that
“the goods are in conformity with the order.”357
After the appointment of Supervigiliancia as the inspection agent, Lawrence began a
barrage of cabled messages to both Supervigiliancia and the manufacturers. The cable
messages sent conflicting instructions to the concerned parties.358 On March 26, 1963,
Supervigilancia executed two certificates of inspection. Each certificate contained
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information including, but not limited to: (1) the fact that the inspection had been carried
out; (2) the letters of credit required it to certify “THAT THE GOODS ARE IN
CONFORMITY WITH THE ORDER”; and (3) a ten percent random sample had been
taken.35936012
The documents were presented to Banco Espanol, which honored them and made
payment on March 28 and 29.

On April 3, State Street cabled its refusal to reimburse

Banco Espanol on the basis that the inspection certificates did not comply with the terms
of the letter of credit. Specifically, State Street argued that the certificates indicated
conformity to samples alleged by the seller to “correspond” to other samples allegedly
approved by Lawrence and that the certificates were issued “under reserves.”
The District Court ruled in favor of State Street arguing that the documents did not
strictly comply with the letter of credit provisions. Further, it pointed out that the
certificate failed in three respects: (1) that it merely certified that the goods conformed to
“conditions”—which left it unclear if the conformity was to the whole of the order or
only part; (2) that there was doubt as to whether the “order-stock-sheet” was different
from the order; and (3) that the certificate was limited to the samples handed to the
inspecting agency by a representative of the manufacturer.

'if.')

The court began its analysis of the case by stating that the majority of case law
supports the notion of strict compliance in letters of credit transactions.

However, the

court noted that strict compliance does not necessarily imply absolute conformity, and
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that some courts have instead looked at the entire transaction rather than one particular
document.364
After discussing the purpose of letters of credit, the court went on to state that in
international business transactions the buyer is not only concerned in the quantity of the
goods it orders, but also the quality.

Thus, in the current case where the buyer

purchased various textiles, the buyer must rely on a sample it had seen and liked. In order
for the buyer to sample the goods, it has two options: (1) to go to the seller or (2) to rely
on the good faith of a sampling agency.366
In the present transaction, the buyer naively appointed a sampling agency and failed
to specify precisely how the inspection was to take place.

The only instructions granted

by the buyer were that the goods were to conform to the order. As far as the sampling
agency was concerned, however, the orders could have merely referred to samples that
might have well been inspected in Spain at some past time. Accordingly, when
Supervigilancia was confronted by the barrage of cables from Lawrence and with the
samples which the sellers had under oath claimed to correspond with the samples
approved earlier by the buyer’s representative in Barcelona, Supervigilancia had to act to
the dissatisfaction of one of the parties in the contract. The fact that Suvigilancia decided
to take the oath of the seller as true was not shocking because such practices are deemed
to be part of the business routine.368
The court saw no significant difference in Supervigilancia being told by the
manufacturers that the samples were those approved by the buyer and being told that they
364
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“correspond” to such samples.

ns Q

#

#

“Correspond” in Webster’s dictionary was found to

mean as “in agreement”, “in conformity”, “equivalent”, “match”, and “equal.”
Therefore, the court overruled the district court’s ruling and found that State Street was to
reimburse Banco Espanol because the documents presented to it did comply with the
terms of the letter of credit.
A few years later, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit was
presented with issue of which compliance standard was to be applied in letter of credit
transactions.

In Flagship Cruises Ltd, Citizens Trust Company of Providence, Rhode

Island (Citizens), requested New England Merchants National Bank of Boston
(Merchants), issue an irrevocable letter of credit bearing the number 18506, to Flagship
Cruises, Ltd. (Flagship), for the account of Christ Travel, Inc.

777

The relevant portions of the letter were: (1) that it is addressed to Flagship “Acting
through its General Agent, Flagship Cruises, Inc.” of New York; (2) that it authorized
Flagship to draw up to $200,000 by sight draft; (3) that all drafts must be marked;
“Drawn under NEMNB Credit No. 18506”; (4) that each draft must be accompanied by
“your signed statement that draft is in conjunction with Letter of Agreement dated May
23, 1972 and Addendum dated June 15, 1972”; and (6) that the credit was subject to the
UCP, 1962 revision.*
37374
On October 31, 1972, Flagship presented to its bank, Chemical Bank, New York
(Chemical), the original letter of credit; copies sight drafts of Merchants, dated October
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31, referring to No. 18506 and ordering payment of $200,000 to Flagship Cruises, Inc.;
and a letter dated October 31 to Chemical from Flagship Cruises Inc., which enclosed the
letter of credit which stated “this irrevocable Letter of Credit is in conjunction with our
Letter of Agreement dated May 23, 1972, and Addendum dated June 15, 1972”, asking
Chemical to “present for collection.”375
Due to a mistake, the documents were not routed to Chemical’s Letter of Credit
Department where the documents would be examined and payment would be
immediately made to Flagship Cruises, Inc. Rather, the documents were received by
Chemical’s International Collection Department, which simply forwarded the drafts to
the issuing bank for payment.376*Accordingly, the documents were not subjected to
standard scrutiny procedures. On November 6, 1972, Chemical mailed the letter of credit
and duplicate drafts, but not the October 31 letter to Merchants. The drafts were endorsed
by Chemical “for and on behalf of Flagship Cruises, Inc.

T77

Merchants received Chemical’s form, the letter of credit, and the duplicate drafts on
November 9, 1972. However, two days earlier, Citizens had written to Merchants
informing it that since Chris Travel, Inc had gone into receivership and the letter of credit
had not been drawn upon prior to its expiration date (November 3), any draft presented to
Merchants should not be honored.378 Merchants advised Chemical twice that it was
refusing to honor the presentation because the expiration of the letter and lack of the
statement called for in the letter of credit.379
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On November 13, Chemical wired Merchants and informed it that it possessed all the
ion

required documents and that there had been a mistake on its part.
claimed that it was too late.

Merchants, however,

lOI

In dealing with Merchants argument for refusing to pay on the basis of the absence of
a statement that the draft was in accordance with the letter of agreement and addendum
specified in the letter of credit, the court cited the October 31 letter of Flagship Cruises
which stated that the letter of credit, not the draft, was in accordance with the specified
documents.

TOO

Had the letter been timely received by Merchants, the court noted that the

requirements of the letter of credit would have been fulfilled. Thus, it was a case of the
greater including the smaller, i.e., the requirement would be satisfied if the entire letter of
lOI

credit on which the draft depended, related to the specific agreement.

This

interpretation did not relax the requirement of strict compliance, but was seen as
io i

“equating a literal requirement for its functional equal.”

The court also dismissed Citizen and Merchant’s arguments that the draft was drawn
by the wrong party (Flagship Cruises, Inc, rather than Flagship), that there was no
statement linking the draft to the agreement and addendum cited in the letter of credit,
and that the draft did not recite the precise legend described in the letter of credit.

The

court quickly dismissed the last of these arguments by identifying that the draft named
Merchants, and thereunder identified “No. 18506.”386 The court found no difficulty in
finding that this was in compliance with the requirement that the draft be marked:
380
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“Drawn under NEMNB Credit No. 18506.” The court could not find any other
interpretation. 387
•

•

As to the first two arguments mentioned above, the court stated, had the October 31
letter of Flagship Cruises, Inc. been timely presented to Merchants, there would have
been no possibility of any confusion on the part of Merchants.

While the Draft was

signed by Flagship Cruises, Inc., with nothing to indicate its relationship to the
beneficiary of the credit, the October 31 letter made it clear in its letterhead that Flagship
Cruises, Inc.389 Thus, what existed was a draft drawn by a party technically different from
the original beneficiary and a letter making it clear that the relationship between the
relevant parties was that of principal and agent.390
Accordingly, the court concluded that Flagship complied with the requirements of the
letter of credit in ever material manner.391 This, however, did not entitle Flagship to
summary judgment.392 The only issue of fact was whether or not presentation was made
timely. If presentation was timely made, then Merchants was to be liable on the letter of
credit.393
In Crocker Commercial Services Inc v Countryside Bank, Crocker Commercial
Services, Inc. (“Crocker”) sued Countryside Bank (“Bank”) for dishonoring a $20,000
irrevocable letter of credit issued in Crocker’s favor as beneficiary.394 The letter was
issued to the account of the Bank’s customer Everyone’s Effort, Inc (“Effort”). On
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January 17, 1980, its name was changed from Crocker United Factors, Inc. to Crocker
•

Commercial Services, Inc.

^ qc

A couple weeks later Bank issued a letter of credit in favor of Crocker which required
that the draft be submitted with the following:
Your signed statement certifying that the funds drawn hereunder are due
you on account of Everyone's Effort, Inc., failure to pay, within terms
quoted therein, invoice(s) issued to them by Crocker Commercial
Services, I IBM Plaza, Suite 3335, Chicago, Illinois 60611 that demand
for payment has been made and the funds have
not been forthcoming from
'lQf.
Everyone's Effort, Inc., or any other source.

Upon Crocker’s failure to collect payment from Effort on January 16, 1981
(expiration was January 21), Crocker presented to Bank its $20,000 sight draft and the
following certification:
We hereby certify that the funds drawn hereunder are due us on account of
Everyone's Effort Inc.'s failure to pay, within terms quoted therein,
invoices issued to them by factored clients of Crocker Commercial
Services, and which are assigned to Crocker Commercial Services, 1 IBM
Plaza, Suite 3335, Chicago, Illinois 60611. We also certify that demand
for payment has been made, and the funds have not been forthcoming
from Everyone's Effort, Inc. or any other source.39536397398

Furthermore, although not required to do so, Crocker accompanied the draft and
certification by copies of the underlying invoices and a summary schedule on a "Crocker
United Factors, Inc." form, listing past due invoices totaling $ 37,392.50.

Crocker

provided Bank with an enclosed envelope in an attempt to avoid delay processing and
provided a telephone number whereby Bank could reach it if any urgency would arise.
However, Bank decided to let the letter of credit expire and then wrote to Crocker stating
395 Ibid.
396 Ibid.
397 Ibid.
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that the documents submitted by Crocker did not comply with the terms of the letter.
Specifically, Bank referred to the discrepancies in the drafts submitted by Crocker and
the accompanying invoices and invoice schedules were those of Crocker United Factors,
Inc. and not of Crocker Commercial Services, Inc.399
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois applied Illinois
law and determined that substantial compliance was the standard applied in Illinois.400
The court noted that Crocker was entitled to payment because the certificate conformed
to the conditions of the letter of credit by referring to “Crocker Commercial Services.”401
Although Crocker did submit documents that referred to “Crocker United Factors, Inc.”
such discrepancy was not considered to be material by the court because it was obvious
that Crocker Commercial Services was Crocker United Factors, Inc.402
Furthermore, Bank’s parsing of the language to distinguish invoices “issued.. .by
Crocker” from invoices “issued by factored clients of Crocker... and... assigned to
Crocker” was determined to be pretextual.403 The letter of credit issued by Bank was
meant to guarantee credit extended by Crocker for the account of Effort, and that is what
took place. Moreover, the court found that the accompanying documents obviously
disclosed the facts in that Crocker’s six-page billing directly to Effort refers to and
itemizes invoices. »«404
•

•
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•

•
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ii. Comments on Substantial Compliance
Opponents of substantial compliance argue that it does not serve the interests of
letters of credit.405 In particular, substantial compliance is neither prompt nor cheap and
therefore is not efficient for parties who have opted to use the letter of credit to finance
their transactions. Substantial compliance requires bankers to know endless information
concerning the practices of every customer and/or beneficiary.406 For example, bank
examiners would be required to know what kind of inspection is required in the garment
industry, what sort of invoices the applicant and beneficiary intended the underlying
transaction to cover in the credit, or whether it is important to the parties that the draft
refer to a specific agreement or that the letter of credit refers to it. This might entail
learning about the garment industry, locomotives, oil exploration, steel manufacturing,
and detailed information regarding the names of particular nuts.
In addition, the banker would likely be forced to investigate the intentions of the
parties in the underlying transaction and resolve the conflicts that arise when the
beneficiary tells him one thing and the applicant another.407 While issuing banks are quite
capable of determining such matters, such determinations require time and expenditure
on the part of the bank. Thus, the banker is forced to play the role of a judge, whereby it
attempts to determine the intentions of the parties.408 Such a procedure ultimately runs
counter to the underlying characteristics of letters of credit; namely that of prompt
payment and low expenditure on the part of the issuing bank.
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The adoption of substantial compliance would provide for more equitable results in
those circumstances where an applicant or issuing bank may insist on oppressive
compliance with the terms and conditions of the letter of credit. By enforcing substantial
compliance courts have a greater ability to rule in what they deem to be equitable. From
the beneficiaries’ perspective, it would translate to spending less time and money on
ensuring that the documentation perfectly conforms. Therefore, the most beneficial
contribution of substantial compliance lays in its ability to allow courts to do what they
believe is “fair” without being constrained by rigid rules of strict compliance.
The ability to provide equitable resolutions through its flexibility is also substantial
compliances greatest flaw. Establishing a uniform approach to substantial compliance is
nearly impossible because each letter of credit transaction is unique. Therefore, different
remedies are called for depending on the facts of each particular case. This renders
creating a stable, uniform approach under the substantial compliance rather difficult. This
is quite unattractive prospect for buyers and sellers who seek clarity and uniformity when
engaging in international business transactions. Moreover, providing courts with the
ability to determine what they deem to be “fair” grants them too much discretionary
power. Commercial parties need consistency and uniformity and only well-established
rules that can be clearly interpreted can provide such services. Therefore, while
substantial compliance appears to be more equitable, its inability to provide commercial
parties with a well-established uniform rule renders its utility in international business
transactions rather low.
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c.

Bifurcated Standard

In the mid-1960s Kozolchyk noted the bifurcated standard while examining the
standard of strict compliance. He found that depending on who was suing whom—(a) the
beneficiary suing the issuing bank after a wrongful dishonor on the one hand or, on the
other hand, where either (b) the issuing bank was suing or (c) where the issuing bank was
being sued by the applicant upon honor of a presentation—courts adopted different
versions of compliance.409 He found courts employed the strict compliance when the
seller-beneficiary sued the issuing bank based on the assumption that issuing banks
generally acted in good faith when rejecting a seller-beneficiary’s presentation. In
contrast, in the cases of (b) or (c) above, courts assumed that buyer-applicants would
shift, if they could, the possibility of risk to the issuing bank and accordingly the courts
employed a substantial compliance test.410
Dolan has found that “there is indeed little more than dictum on the bifurcated
standard and a paucity of reasoning.”411 He has also argued that the bifurcated standard
was not meant as an argument against strict compliance or as a suggestion that such a
standard would be better. To the contrary, he found that duties owed by the issuing bank
to its customer are governed by different sources of law than those that govern the issuing
banking and beneficiary relationship.412 Thus, when an applicant’s instructions specified
terms A, B, and C and the letter of credit was issued containing only terms A and B (C
being negligently omitted), the beneficiary was entitled to payment when it tendered A
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and B. At the same time, the applicant is entitled to deny reimbursement to the issuing
bank for failure to follow its instructions.413
What emerges from this analysis is that it cannot be assumed that disputes that
emerge from the two relationships address the same issues or involve the same promises
or sources of liability. Thus, a distinction between the remedial context of the sellerbeneficiary’s action for wrongful dishonor and the applicant’s action for wrongful honor
is warranted. Depending on the nature of the relationship between the issuing bank and
the applicant, the issuing bank may be able to claim immunity or diminished liability for
failure to apply the strict standard.414
Moses argues that strict compliance leads to inefficiencies and delays as the issuing
bank often include in the reimbursement agreement between itself and the applicant a
clause that the applicant must reimburse the issuing bank so long as the documents
substantially comply.415 Interestingly, the Official Comment of Article 5 seems to
recognize this practice. The Official Comment notes “issuers can, and often do, contract
with their applicants for expanded rights of reimbursement. Where that is done, the
beneficiary will have to meet a more stringent standard of compliance as to the [issuing
bank] than the [issuing bank] will have to meet as to the applicant.”416 The Official
Comment indicates that the UCC recognizes that commercial parties do indeed enter into
contracts that directly adopt a bifurcated standard. Unfortunately, the Official Comment
fails to detail why divergent standards should be used.
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The bifurcated standard is not without controversy.417*One of the problems of this
standard is its presumption, that is—why should an applicant who objects in good faith to
a defective presentation be presumed to be attempting to shift the risk to the issuing
bank?

Another problem is that the standard cannot remain bifurcated or distinct in its

application to each relationship.419 For example, a situation may arise whereby the
issuing bank dishonors a presentation by the seller-beneficiary on the grounds of strict
compliance. If, however, the beneficiary can demonstrate that the issuing bank was
reimbursed by the applicant why not provide the seller-beneficiary with remedy where
the issuing bank pays the seller-beneficiary the amount the issuing bank received in
reimbursement?420
Commercial parties engaging in an international business transaction who finance
their transaction through the use of letters of credit need a standard that is uniform in
application. The bifurcated standard unnecessarily complicates matters. As discussed
earlier, different standards of compliance are applied according to whom is being sued.
Commercial parties would significantly benefit from a uniform approach whereby they
can modify their behavior in order to achieve their expectations. The bifurcated standard
cannot provide straightforward uniform approach that allows the commercial parties to
meet their expectations.
The reasoning behind the bifurcated standard—adopting strict compliance in those
circumstances where the issuing bank is being sued by the beneficiary based on the
presumption that issuing banks reject presentations in good-faith, and adopting
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substantial compliance in those circumstances where the beneficiary sues the issuing
banks is based on the assumption that the beneficiary seeks to shift the risk of loss, if
possible, to the issuing bank—is fundamentally unfair and incapable of meeting the
challenges of letter of credit transactions. As mentioned above, there may be
circumstances where an applicant objects to the payment based upon a good-faith
argument, in such circumstances why should the applicant be subjected to strict
compliance while the issuing bank is merely subjected to a substantial compliance test.
i. Bifurcated Standard Case Law
Case law applying the bifurcated standard is not as extensive as those applying strict
or substantial compliance. Initially, the cases were limited to very few jurisdictions. The
following lines of cases outline the fundamental tenets of the standard.
In Far Eastern Textile Ltd v City National Bank & Trust Co, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio was confronted with the issue of what
standard of compliance Ohio should apply when determining whether a presentation
complies with the terms and conditions of a letter of credit.42142
Nu-Look Fashions Menswear (“Nu Look”) entered into a contract with Far Eastern
Textile, Ltd. (“Far Eastern”) for the purchase of men’s’ clothing to be manufactured by
Far Eastern.

To facilitate this transaction, Nu Look had City National Bank and Trust

Company (“CNB”) issue a letter of credit in favor of Far Eastern for the amount of
$339,112.00. Among the required conditions in the credit were an “Original Purchase
Order signed by Larry Fannin and accepted by Seller,” and an “Inspection Certificate

421 Far Eastern Textile Ltd v City National Bank & Trust Co, 430 F Supp 193 at 196 (SD OH 1977).
422 Ibid at 194.
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signed by Larry Fannin and Harry Le Beau.”423 The letter of credit was amended twice
with the December amendment changing the terms of the inspection certificate to read
‘Inspection Certificate may be signed by either Larry Fannin, or Paul Thomas, or Harry
Le Beau.” 424
In 1973 Fannin and Thomas travelled to Taiwan to inspect the goods. They found the
goods to be unsatisfactory and consequently rejected them. An accommodation was
reached whereby the initial purchase order was rewritten. Subsequently, another trip was
made by Thomas to Taiwan where it is unclear whether Thomas accepted the goods or a
partial shipment of the goods.425
Far Eastern submitted the documents to CNB for honor. CNB, however, found certain
discrepancies and refused to honor until assurance was obtained from Fannin. One of the
discrepancies was an original purchase order signed “Larry Fannin by Paul Thomas”
rather than simply “Larry Fannin.”426 CNB paid the draft.427
By March 10, 1974, Far Eastern shipped approximately 4000 dozen pairs of pants to
Nu-Look. Far Eastern presented the draft to CNB and two discrepancies were found in
the documents.428 One of them was that the purchase order had been signed “Larry
Fannin by Paul Thomas” instead of just simply “Larry Fannin.”429 This mistake was the
exact same one made previously. When CNB sought permission to pay this time, NuLook refused. 430
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The court noted that New York follows a bifurcated standard whereby it requires
strict compliance with the terms of the letter when the bank is being sued by the
beneficiary for refusing to honor the drafts presented. In those cases where the issuing
bank is being sued by the applicant for wrongful payment, courts apply the substantial
compliance test.431
In adopting the bifurcated standard, the court stated that the rationale behind this
particular standard was persuasive considering the ministerial roles bank play in
international transactions.432 In such transactions, banks merely guarantee the availability
of funds and make payment when certain specified conditions occur. They are not
expected to participate in any dispute between the applicant and beneficiary regarding the
performance of the transaction. Accordingly, banks should be allowed to avoid secondguessing the “propriety, validity, or conformity” of the necessary documents.433 Further,
international transactions would be hindered by requiring banks to obtain some form of
prior decision to protect them from liability. Therefore, it is reasonable to hold the
beneficiary to a strict compliance standard when it seeks to hold the bank accountable for
refusing to honor presentation. Any standard short of this would force banks confronted
with a discrepancy to resolve the issue of whether the discrepancy was substantial enough
to support its decision to dishonor. Such a role for banks goes beyond its ministerial
function.434 Giving banks the benefit of substantial compliance when suit is brought by
the applicant is logical because the applicant was the party that supplied the bank with the
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terms and conditions of the credit and therefore any ambiguities should be interrupted
.

. 435

against it.

The court applied strict compliance standard because Far Eastern was the beneficiary.
The court found that Far Eastern failed to fulfill the specific condition of credit that
required it to submit an “original purchase order signed by Larry Fannin and accepted by
seller.” Therefore, CNB did not err in refusing to honor the presentation of the
documents.436

.

In TransAmerica Delaval Inc v Citibank, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York decided to apply the bifurcated standard where a dispute
arose between the commercial parties as to which standard of compliance applied to the
letter of credit.437*
Delaval entered into a contract with Electrical Work and Maintenance (“EWM”) for
the sale of diesel-powered generators to be constructed by Delaval.

In order to ensure

that Delaval would secure performance, the contract required that Delaval establish an
irrevocable letter of credit with Citibank’s Saudi Arabian branch in Jeddah (“FNCB
Jeddah”) for $2,809,833.00 US in favor of EWM payable through Banque du Caire.439
On November 13, 1975, in accordance with the credit agreement between the parties,
Citibank’s predecessor, First National City Bank, issued a letter of credit in favor of
FNCB Jeddah to support the letter guarantee issued by FNCB Jeddah. Saudi American
Bank (“Samba”) thereafter succeeded to the rights and liabilities of FNCB Jeddah under
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the letter of credit and guarantee.440 The letter of credit provided that it expired on July
31, 1978. Both the letter of credit and guarantee, however, were later extended.
Specifically, the letter of credit was extended with Delaval’s permission to September 30,
1981, and the letter of guarantee was extended with Delaval’s consent to August 31,
1981, and by Samble to August 31, 1982 without Delaval’s consent.441
A dispute between EWM and Delaval arose regarding Delaval’s performance under
the contract.442 On approximately July 21, 1981, EWM wrote to Banque du Caire stating
that Delaval had failed to meet its obligations under the contract and instructed Banque
du Caire to seek an extension of the letter of guarantee up to August 31, 1982. On
September 1, 1981, Samba sent a series of telexes to Citibank requesting either an
extension of the guarantee or payment of the full value of the guarantee. Samba’s
September 1, 1981, telex in part stated:
BENE [EWM] HAS REFUSED TO ACCEPT GTEE
EXTENSION OF 6 MONTHS STP THEY HAVE GIVEN
US TILL THURSDAY I.E. EPT. 03.81 EITHER TO
EXTEND GTEE TO ONE YEAR OR PAY THEM
USDLR 2,809,333.00 STP WE WILL AWAIT YOUR
INSTRUCTIONS TILL THEN IF WE DO NOT HEAR
FROM YOU FUNDS WILL BE PAID THEREFORE
EITHER ARRANGE EXTENSION OR CREDIT OUR
ACCOUNT FOR VALUE OF UR LC STP ANY DELAY
FROM SEPT 03.81 ONWARD WILL BE PAID WITH
INTEREST STP HOPE TO RECEIVE A POSITIVE
REPLY STP.443
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When Citibank discovered that Delaval would not consent to an extension of the
letter of guarantee Citibank honored Samba’s demand for payment under the letter of
credit on September 2, 1982.444
When learning that its account funds in Citibank were insufficient to cover the
amount paid by Citibank to Samba under the letter of credit, Delaval transferred
$2,500,000.00 on September 2, 1981. Thus, Citibank received full reimbursement of its
payments to Samba.445
The underlying question presented in the case was whether Samba’s demand for
payment contained in its series of telexes to Citibank were in compliance with the
conditions specified in the letter of credit issued by Citibank.446 Citibank argued that
strict compliance is appropriate only when suit is brought against the issuer by the
beneficiary of the letter of credit.447 However, because the suit was brought against the
issuing bank by its customer, Citibank alleged that a substantial compliance standard was
appropriate. Ultimately, Citibank was putting forth the so-called “bifurcated standard.”448
The court stated that the UCC failed to specify the appropriate standard of
compliance.449 The court concluded that Samba’s demand for payment, while not strictly
complying with the language of the letter of credit, did substantially comply with the
terms such that Citibank’s payment pursuant to the demand was proper and reasonable
under the conditions of the transaction. Therefore, the court adopted a substantial
compliance test.450
444
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In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that the letter of credit is an independent
contract, separate and apart from the Credit Agreement between Delaval and Citibank.431
In the Credit Agreement, Delaval failed to specify any particular language which would
constitute a proper demand of payment by the beneficiary under the letter of credit. In
failing to provide such language, Delaval necessarily relied upon Citibank to establish the
proper language which would constitute the appropriate demand for payment by the
beneficiary. Having failed to specify the language to be contained in the demand pursuant
to the letter of credit, the court found that it was unreasonable for Delaval to insist upon
strict compliance with the language in which Citibank determined in good faith to have
believed had been substantially complied with. Had Delaval wanted precise and specific
language in the Credit Agreement, it was Delaval’s responsibility to put forth such
language it desired.4
51452
The court also found that Citibank’s payment was not wrongful because in the course
of normal banking practices, Citibank could not be held responsible for Samba’s failure
to disburse the funds under its letter of guarantee after representing on September 1,
1981, that if an extension was not obtained “FUNDS WILL BE PAID.”453
III. Conclusion
The particular standard of compliance a court selects to impose on a letter of credit
transaction may play a significant role in determining whether a beneficiary gets paid.
Theoretically, the applicant should insist on the beneficiary submitting documents that
strictly comply because such compliance unsures a greater likelihood that the goods
shipped conform to the underlying sales contract. The beneficiary, on the other hand,
451 Ibid.
452 Ibid.
453 Id. at 204-205.
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prefers substantial compliance in an attempt to lower its costs. However, if the
beneficiary is not assured that the applicant will waive any minor discrepancies, then its
interests are firmly entrenched in strict compliance.
The inability of US courts to precisely define a particular standard has led to
uncertainty and confusion in letter of credit transactions. While most transactions are not
litigated, in those circumstances where a payment dispute does lead to litigation, the
commercial parties are often left unsure about their rights and obligations. In large and
complex international business transactions, such uncertainty is costly and threatens the
underlying objectives of both the applicant and beneficiary.

105

CHAPTER FOUR
THE “BILATERAL ASSURANCE” MECAHNISM
I. Introduction
This chapter is dedicated to investigating the research question posed in this
dissertation—why do sophisticated commercial parties pay substantial fees for the
issuance of letters of credit and subsequently choose not to take advantage of its greatest
benefit, i.e., legally enforcing the terms and conditions. The first portion of the chapter
summarizes the shortcomings of both the traditional “assured payment” explanation and
Mann’s verification explanation. Specifically, the “assured payment” rationale’s inability
to explain the high rate of discrepancies and the applicant’s subsequent waiver of the
discrepancies is once more given consideration. In addition, Mann’s rationale is critiqued
for its incompleteness; in particular, its failure to recognize that both the applicant and
beneficiary use the letter of credit for verification purposes. Moreover, Mann’s study
ignores that there are circumstances where the commercial parties may choose to legally
enforce the letter of credit, particularly where the relationship between the commercial
parties breaks down.
Second, the “bilateral assurance” mechanism is proposed as the answer to the
research question posed in this dissertation. A discussion of the role of asymmetric
information and moral hazard within the context of international business transactions is
pursued. Then, a discussion of informational signaling, with a particular emphasis on the
role of “soft” information is undertaken. Next, a detailed examination of the required
documentation is reported with the intent of showing how the particular documentation
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provides the commercial parties with the information they need to determine whether or
not to use the letter of credit.
The issue of the relevant standard of compliance under the “bilateral assurance”
mechanism is explored. In particular, a modified strict compliance standard is proposed
because it provides the beneficiary with the incentive to complete the underlying sales
contract by producing and shipping goods that substantively conform while
simultaneously protecting the beneficiary from oppressive application of the mirrorimage strict compliance standard. Then, the role of equitable remedies, specifically,
good-faith and estoppel, are examined. Moreover, the issue of excessive documentation,
identified in Saktchutchawam’s research, is addressed by discussing why applicants
waive discrepancies.
II. Shortcomings of the Traditional “Assured-Payment” Mechanism and the
“Verification” Explanation
Both the traditional and Mann’s “verification” explanations fail to adequately clarify
why commercial parties pay substantial fees for the issuance of letters of credit. The
traditional explanation is incapable of justifying the overwhelming presentation of
discrepant documents by beneficiaries and the subsequent waiver of these discrepancies
by the applicant.
Under the traditional “assured payment” explanation, commercial parties pay for the
issuance of the letter of credit because it provides for prompt and secure payment.454 It
possesses such attributes because it requires the applicant to pay the beneficiary upon the
issuing bank receiving conforming documents. Accordingly, if the beneficiary does not
submit documents that conform to the terms and conditions imposed by the applicant in
454 Chow & Schoenbaum, supra note (1) at 252.
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the letter of credit, then the beneficiary is not entitled to payment.453 Thus, under this
theory, the issuing bank simply examines the documents submitted and compares them to
the terms and conditions of the letter of credit. Hence, the letter of credit is an instrument
that possesses its value in its legal enforceability—if the documents submitted do not
match the terms and conditions, then the issuing bank does not pay the beneficiary.
The “assured payment” explanation, however, fails to correspond with commercial
practices of buyers and sellers using letters of credit. Mann’s empirical study found that
in the overwhelming majority of transactions the beneficiary submitted discrepant
documents. Moreover, these discrepancies were waived in almost every transaction by
the applicant.45456457This implies that commercial parties are not taking advantage of the
fundamental characteristic of the letter of credit—its legal enforceability. Hence, Mann
proposed an alternative account of why sophisticated commercial parties use letters of
credit. This account focuses upon the “verification” service that letters of credit provide
beneficiaries with regards to the applicant’s financial solvency.437
Mann’s verification explanation, however, fails to answer why sophisticated
commercial parties would pay for a letter of credit, draft it, and then use it in a way that
removes its main formal advantage—its legal enforceability against the issuing bank.
Stating that the issuance of a letter of credit is a signal of the buyer’s creditworthiness
simply does not provide a sufficient answer. If the seller seeks a reliable signal, then the
issuance of a letter of credit, backed by its legal enforceability, would provide an even
stronger signal. The larger the penalty paid to the bank in the event of the buyer’s default,
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the more credible the issuing bank’s representation that the chance of default is low.458
Further, a bank that faces the threat of not being reimbursed by an applicant, and not just
the threat of its long-term reputation, has a greater incentive to closely monitor the
buyer’s behavior and ensure its compliance with the underlying sales contract. Moreover,
the issuing bank will also have a greater incentive to screen the applicant diligently
before issuing the letter of credit. Thus, an issuing bank that assumes both legal and
reputational liability will have greater incentives to ensure the functioning of a letter of
credit.459
If legal enforceability could lower the cost of sending a credible signal concerning the
buyer’s credibility, why do the commercial parties not structure the letter of credit so that
it is both formally, as well as practically, binding on the issuing bank?460
Katz states that the argument of document preparation is not an appropriate answer
because the commercial parties could draft the documentary conditions to cover those
incomplete documents that Mann demonstrates beneficiaries submit and issuing bank and
applicants routinely accept.461 Article 5 of the UCC leaves it to the commercial parties to
determine which specific documents serve as conditions for drawing on a letter of
credit.462
Accordingly, the puzzle posed by Mann’s empirical study remains. His study shows
that commercial parties go through substantial costs to cast their transaction in a legal
form that, if properly functioning and complied with by the seller, provides a cheap,
secure, and prompt method of payment. Mann’s research, however, also shows that the
458
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commercial parties do not use this method to secure payment, but instead, prefer informal
methods that are backed by reputational sanctions. Mann accounts for his findings by
stating that commercial parties are interested in verifying the buyer’s likelihood to pay
the seller, and not the legal enforceability per se.
Katz finds Mann’s explanation to be unconvincing particularly considering that
reputational sanctions alone are likely to be a more expensive verification device than
alternative devices that provide similar services, or the same letter of credit backed by
legal enforceability.463 According to Katz, if the buyer and seller are rational commercial
parties, then they must be buying more than merely the verification of the buyer’s
reliability.464
III. The “Bilateral Assurance” Mechanism: Adverse Selection and Moral
Hazard in the International Business Transaction Context
The long-distance character of international business transactions, combined with the
unfamiliarity of the commercial parties, renders the threat of risk in international business
transactions quite high. Both the buyer and seller face various risks that include, but are
not limited to: receiving non-conforming goods, failure to obtain payment, and litigation
costs in an unfamiliar jurisdiction. The issue of asymmetric information; particularly
adverse selection and moral hazard, play a fundamental role when two commercial
parties decide to enter into an international business transaction. This section addresses
the theory of asymmetric information by examining moral hazard and adverse selection.
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Asymmetric information is a prevalent problem that arises in many commercial
contexts particularly when the seller knows more about a product than the buyer. There
are two types of asymmetric information: moral hazard and adverse selection.463
In moral hazard problems the parties have the same information when the relationship
is established, and the information asymmetry arises when the contract is signed, the
principal cannot observe or verify the action or the effort of the agent, or at the minimum,
cannot perfectly control the action.4
65466
An adverse selection problem arises when the agent withholds private information
before the relationship begins.467 In such instances, the principal may verify the agent’s
behavior, but the optimal decision, or the cost of this decision, depends upon the certain
characteristics of the production process of which the agent is the only informed party.468
George Akerlof is largely accredited for developing the theory of moral hazard with
the used car market as an example of the problem of quality uncertainty.469 In his
influential paper, The Market for ‘Lemons Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, Akerloff states that there are two types of used cars: good used cars and
“lemons”, defective used cars.470
A used car may be defective because of ordinary wear and tear, the owner’s driving
style, quality, frequency of maintenance, and accident history.471 There are many traits of
a car that are hidden from the buyer and not easily accessible for inspection. Thus, the
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buyer of the car does not know whether the car is a “lemon” beforehand. Accordingly,
the buyer assumes that any given car is of average quality. As a result, the buyer will only
pay the average price of an average car. This implies that the owners of well-maintained
cars cannot get a high enough price to make selling that car worthwhile.472
Owners of well-maintained cars will not place their cars on the market. This results in
the reduction of the overall quality of cars in the market. This, in turn, reduces the
buyer’s expectations for any given car. Therefore, owners of moderately well-maintained
cars do not have an incentive to place their cars in the market.473 This process results in a
market in which there is asymmetrical information with respect to quality. Not all
commercial players in a given market will follow the same rules or have same aptitude in
assessing quality. Thus, there is always an incentive for sellers to sell low-quality goods
to the less informed buyers.
Accordingly, markets involving quality uncertainty may fail. Akerloff identifies used
cars, the difficulties elders have in obtaining insurance, the employment of minorities,
and the failure of credit markets as other examples that face similar informational
issues. 474
•

Kathryn Spier examines the issue of asymmetric information through the notion of
contractual incompleteness. She provides several examples of situations where
contractual incompleteness can be attributed to asymmetric information. She states that a
party may refrain from including a particular clause in a contract in order to signal its
type.473 One example that explains this occurrence is profit sharing.476 In collective
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bargaining, unions are often skeptical when management proposes the inclusion of a
profit-sharing clause. The union assumes that if management has confidential information
concerning future profits, then it is more likely to include a profit-sharing agreement
when the company expects a loss. The unions expected return from the proposed
agreement is lower than average and the contract’s terms must be favorable to induce the
union to concede.477
Another example includes negotiations over an athlete’s contract.478 The athlete’s
agent may request that the athlete refrain from requesting an injury clause because the
team management may infer from such a request that the athlete is more prone to
accidents and would make the terms of the contract less favorable.479 An additional
example includes an individual being reluctant to ask his fiancé to sign a prenuptial
agreement because that may lead her to believe that the chances of the marriage
succeeding will be lower than she had thought.480
A buyer and seller who enter into international business transaction face various risks.
The commercial parties may not have a prior course of dealing and are weary of each
other. Specifically, the buyer is concerned that if it pays the seller before receiving the
goods, it will not receive conforming goods. The seller, on the other hand, is concerned
that if it produces and ships the goods before receiving payment, the buyer will refrain
from paying for the goods. These concerns are further exacerbated by the long-distance
relationship which renders it more difficult for the commercial parties to obtain
information regarding the credibility of the respected party. Furthermore, the potential
476
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risks in international business transactions are more significant because of costs that are
associated with potentially litigating in an unfamiliar jurisdiction.
IV.

Informational Signaling and the “Bilateral Assurance” Mechanism

After learning its type, and before signing the contract, the agent can send a signal
that can be interpreted by the principal.481482Thus, before the principal offers a contract, the
agent can take a decision that may influence the principal’s perception about the agent’s
identity.

To illustrate how this may work, consider a worker whose abilities are

difficult to measure when the principal offers the contract. The worker attempts to reveal
his characteristics by obtaining a university degree, even though its content may have
nothing to do with the tasks involved with the job at hand.483
On some occasions it is the principal who has information that it attempts to signal to
the agent, before the agent agrees to accept the offer of the contract. In such
circumstances the principal may signal its private information via its behavior.484
Michael Spence’s “information signaling” theory has been very influential in the
literature of asymmetry information. He uses the analogy of the job market to
demonstrate how his theory on information uncertainty works. Under his theory, when an
employer seeks to hire an employee, the employer is not sure of the productive abilities
of his potential employee.485 The employer is able to observe evident characteristics and
personal attributes, such as the candidate’s education, previous work experience, race,
sex, and criminal record.486 Spence defines those attributes that the potential employee

481Stadler & Perez-Castrillo, supra note (465) at 12.
482 Ibid.
483 Ibid.
484 Ibid
485 Michael Spence, “Job Market Signaling” (1973) 87 the Quarterly J Economics 355 at 356.
486 Ibid at 357.

114

can alter, for example, education, as “signals” and those personal attributes that cannot
change, such as race or sex, as “indices.”487
The employer has a specific expected marginal product when confronted by a
particular set of signals and indices.488 This expectation sets the wage offered by the
employer to the employee. The applicant cannot alter his indices. Signals, on the other
hand, can be altered and are subject to manipulation.489 There are costs to making these
changes. For example, obtaining education is costly. Spence refers to these costs as
“signaling costs.”490 An individual has the ability of selecting signals (the ability to obtain
more education if they chose to do so) to maximize the difference between wages offered
and signaling costs.491
In his theory Spence assumes that a signal will not effectively distinguish one
applicant from another unless the costs of signaling are negatively correlated with the
productive capability.492 If this condition fails to hold, given the offered wage, every
applicant will invest in the same way and thus cannot be distinguished from one another.
Accordingly, he assumes signaling costs are negatively correlated to productivity.493
The process can be viewed as a cycle where employers’ conditional probabilities are
modified, offered wage schedules, applicant behavior with respect to signal choice
changes, and after hiring, new data become available to the employer.494
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a. Information Signaling within the “Bilateral Assurance ” Mechanism
Within the international business transaction context, unfamiliar commercial parties
face various asymmetric and moral hazard dilemmas. Ideally, the buyer insists on an
open account payment option while the seller prefers prepayment. However, the buyer is
likely to oppose prepayment because of its concern that the seller may produce and ship
non-conforming goods. Moreover, the seller is concerned that it will produce and ship the
goods and not receive payment under the open account payment option.
The letter of credit is meant to provide a compromise between the prepayment and
open account mechanisms. However, the various risks continue to be present even in this
form of payment. For example, the applicant has an incentive to place as many terms and
conditions it can in the letter of credit. Furthermore, it may have an interest in ensuring
strict compliance with the terms and conditions. The beneficiary, on the other hand,
desires to keep its costs down by arguing for the inclusion of the least amount of terms
and conditions in the letter of credit and merely substantial compliance with the terms
and conditions.
The answer to the underlying research question posed in this thesis lies in the bilateral
nature of the incentive and informational problems facing international commercial
parties. As has been stressed throughout this dissertation, the seller’s primary objective is
payment by a buyer in a foreign locale. Meanwhile, the buyer is concerned with the
seller’s performance; that is, the shipment of the goods that conform to the quantity,
quality, and description agreed to in the underlying transaction. Accordingly, just as the
seller seeks to obtain reliable credit information about an unfamiliar customer in a distant
location and wishes to avoid the costs of litigation in an unfamiliar jurisdiction, so does
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the buyer. Thus, the seller and buyer face the similar need for verification of each other’s
contractual reliability.
If the parties use a letter of credit with minimal conditions, the seller would have little
reason to worry about the buyer’s non-payment, but the buyer would have significant
reason to worry about the seller’s performance. If, however, the commercial parties rely
entirely on the reputational interest of the issuing bank to ensure the buyer’s performance,
the buyer would have the greatest protection, and the seller would have less.495 Katz
argues that using the letter of credit in the manner described by Mann provides an
intermediate solution that balances the need for verification and enforcement of the buyer
and seller. The key, according to Katz, may lie in the fact that the conditions of the letter
of credit are set strictly as a matter of legal formality, but overwhelmingly waived in
practice.496
To see how this explanation may be plausible, consider the following alternative
explanation based on the following assumptions. First is the existence of “soft
“information.497 Soft information refers to the information that comes from a wide variety
of communications and signals.498 In the typical international business transaction the
first contact between the parties is usually initiated by the buyer who sends a letter
requesting information on the price of particular goods that it seeks to purchase.499 This
letter often seeks a pro forma invoice from the seller which includes several pricing
options and that will include the price of the goods and various shipment arrangements.500
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Often, negotiations follow the issuance of the pro forma voice. After considering the
terms of the pro forma invoice, the buyer determines whether to make a purchase and
sends a purchase order.501
Such information is usually relayed in the period leading up to the performance of the
underlying sales contract and signals that the buyer and seller are likely to perform. This
information is regarded as reliable by both the buyer and seller. Such information,
however, is not enforceable by a court. The inability of courts to verify this information
implies that the parties cannot directly condition their letter of credit on them.502 The
ability of the buyer and seller to observe such behavior on their own, however, allows the
parties to modify their behavior based upon such soft information.503 Ultimately, the
seller’s decision to submit conforming documents, and the buyer’s decision to waive any
discrepancies, may be based upon soft information.
The other form of “soft” information comes from a wide variety of concrete actions
that the buyer and seller can take that are correlated, but are not the equivalent of,
substantive contractual performance.504 Such concrete actions include the preparation of
documents such as the commercial invoice, packing lists, inspection certificates, bill of
ladings, and consular invoices.505 Producing such documentation is costly for the seller
and both parties have the incentive to avoid or minimize them. On the other hand, the
production of such documentation is concrete, observable, and verifiable by courts at a
low cost.506 Most importantly for both parties is that such documentation can be legally
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enforceable. Furthermore, they may establish the basis of the documentary terms of
letters of credit.507
i.

Informational Signaling via the Preparation of Documentation
Required Under the Letter of Credit Regime

The particular documentation required in an international business transaction are
placed in the letter of credit by the applicant. As Sakchutchawam’s research demonstrates
in many circumstances the applicant imposes excessive documentation requirements
which results in the beneficiary’s inability to adhere to the terms and conditions of the
letter of credit. Such excessive requirements are unnecessary in most circumstances
because the preparation of certain documentation signals to the commercial parties the
substantive performance of the underlying sales contract. These documents include: the
bill of lading, insurance certificate, packing list, inspection certificate, certificate of
origin, and commercial invoice.
The documentation maintain an interdependent relationship whereby each document
reinforces the others. Each document possesses details that complements and
supplements other documentation. For example, the goods described must match each
other in the commercial invoice and bill of lading. This ability allows the buyer to
determine whether the seller has substantively completed the underlying sales contract
because the preparation of documentation, as well as the information they entail, signal to
the buyer performance. More importantly, the documents provide the applicant with legal
remedy because they can be enforced by courts. This is crucial in those “end-game”
situations where the signals sent via informal channels indicate that beneficiary is not
performing its obligation under the transaction, thus requiring the applicant to legally
507 Ibid.
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enforce the letter of credit or where the signals point to the applicant refusing to waive
minor discrepancies, requiring the beneficiary to produce documentation that strictly
conform to the terms and conditions of the letter of credit.
The bill of lading is a document used for sea shipment and represents ownership of
the goods.

It is a formal signed receipt of a number of specific packs, which is issued

to the seller’s agent by a shipping line when the shipping line receives the goods.*509 The
bill of lading is deemed “clean” if the cargo is in good order and properly packed when
received by the shipping line. Shipment “on board” a named vessel and the date must be
noted on the bill of lading.510
The shipping line assumes full liability of the cargo described in the bill.511512The
amount of freight charges on the bill of lading must match those on the invoice. The
weight and packages on the bill of ladings must match those on the packing list. The
description of the merchandise must also match those on the commercial invoice and
letter of credit. Moreover, ports of loading and destination, consignee, and notify party
must correspond to those in the letter of credit. All the original bill(s) of lading must be
signed.

Further, any modifications whether corrections, additions, or changes must be

initialed. Finally, the bill of lading must be presented within 21 days of the on board date
shown on the bill of lading, unless specified otherwise in the letter of credit.513
The bill of lading serves two functions: it is a contract of carriage under which the
carrier promises to transport the goods to a particular destination and the seller promises

308 Alibaba.com, Alibaba Trade Forums, online: Shipping Documentation
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to pay the carrier’s fees. The bill of lading also determines to whom the goods are
delivered .514
A commercial invoice is a bill provided by the seller to the buyer. It is often used by
governments to assess the value of the goods with regards to customs duties. It must
show the terms of the sale, i.e., CIF, FOB, etc.515 Moreover, it must be addressed to the
buyer. Further, it must be signed by the beneficiary, as is required in the letter of credit.516*
The amount of freight charges must match with that shown in the bill of lading. Finally,
an exact description of the merchandise as described in the letter of credit must be present
in the commercial invoice.
An insurance certificate is a certificate that represents the insurance taken out by
either the buyer or seller, depending on the particular INCOTERMS, for the shipment of
cargo.

The insurance must be taken out for the total value of the goods as recognized in

the commercial invoice, including freight and insurance charges, plus 10 percent, unless
detailed otherwise in the letter of credit.519 The insurance must not be dated later than the
on board date listed on the bill of lading, unless the insurance coverage has been issued to
cover the goods prior to the boarding of the ship—from warehouse to warehouse.520 The
insurance must be issued in the same currency as the letter of credit. If the beneficiary is
the shipper, the shipper must endorse the back of it. The insurance certificate must be as
specified in the letter of credit and must be issued and/or signed by the insurance
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company or its agents or by underwriters. In addition, coverage must be sufficient to
cover all the risks required on the letter of credit.521
The packing list details the number of specific items in each pack, along with
individual weights and dimensions.522 The packing list is meant to allow the buyer to
determine that the correct amount of units has been received. It must also be consistent
with all the other documents.523
A certificate of origin is a document that certifies the place of growth, production, or
manufacture of goods. It is required by some countries when exporting to them.524 The
certificate of origin identifies the goods and contains a certification from the government,
or from the local Chamber of Commerce, that the goods originate in a specific country.525
The certificate of origin or consular invoice must agree in form with the commercial
invoice, bill of lading, and letter of credit. The description of the goods must also be in
agreement with the commercial invoice, bill of lading, and letter of credit. Both the
weight and value of the goods must also match the required documentation in the
transaction. In some instances, it may be necessary for the consular’s invoice to be visaed
by the Chamber of Commerce or the buyer’s counsel, unless stated otherwise in the letter
of credit.
Under the soft information and concrete action approach, the seller sends the buyer
signals of reliability via informal channels.526 Such signals of reliability mean that the
seller does not have to concern itself with strict compliance with the documentary
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conditions of the letter of credit. The signals of reliability portrayed by the soft
information, and the production of the discussed documentation, provides the buyer with
the knowledge that performance of the underlying sales contract is likely to be
substantively completed notwithstanding any documentary discrepancies. Accordingly,
the buyer is more likely to waive such discrepancies when they occur.527 The seller, who
anticipates the buyer waiving the discrepancies, can save time and costs of formal
documentation by complying with terms and conditions substantially but not strictly.528
Conversely, a buyer who receives signals of deficiency through informal channels
will less likely waive any discrepancies because the buyer will have strong signals that
the seller has failed to substantially perform the underlying sales contract.529 A seller who
expects facing such difficulties can protect itself by diligently ensuring strict compliance
with the terms and conditions of the letter of credit.530 Ensuring strict compliance,
however, comes at more expense to the seller but provides it with more security.
V.

The “Bilateral Assurance” Mechanism and Strict Compliance Standard

The “bilateral assurance” model further comports with the traditional explanation of
how letters of credit function.531 In particular, the standards of compliance continue to
play a critical role in the “bilateral assurance” mechanism. Recall from Chapter Three
that there are three standards of compliance—strict, substantial, and bifurcated—that
have been implemented by American jurisdictions.
Under the traditional explanation, the beneficiary is legally entitled to payment so
long as it presents documents that conform to the terms and conditions of the letter of
527
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credit. Unfortunately, courts have struggled to adopt a uniform approach with regards to
the interpretation and implementation of these standards in letter of credit transactions.
This has created a diversity of interpretations among, and within, the compliance
standards.
Generally, the seller does not necessarily have to invest substantial time and costs
ensuring the documentation comply so long as the information indicates that the buyer
will waive minor discrepancies.532 Thus, it seems apparent that in most international
business transactions the beneficiary merely needs to substantially comply with terms and
conditions. Mann’s empirical study confirms this reality by indicating that 60 percent of
the discrepancies can be attributed to minor discrepancies that do not concern the
quantity, quality, and description of the goods. This also explains why applicants waive
over 90 percent of the discrepancies.
The “bilateral assurance” mechanism establishes that sophisticated commercial
parties use letters of credit in “endgame” situations where the relationship between the
buyer and seller deteriorates and collapses. Therefore, in most circumstances, the
commercial parties do not enforce the letter of credit.
Under the “bilateral assurance” explanation, the effectiveness of the informal
channels, as well as the required documentation, demonstrate whether the commercial
parties have substantively complied with their agreements. Strict compliance plays a
fundamental role in interpreting the signals received by the applicant and beneficiary.
Specifically, the requirement of strict compliance provides the applicant with the
protection where the information passed by the informal channels indicate that the
beneficiary has not substantively performed the underlying sales contract. If such
532 Ibid.
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information is passed on, the applicant may enforce the letter of credit and insist upon
strict compliance thereby allowing it to refrain from paying the beneficiary.
Strict compliance also provides the beneficiary with the incentive to perform the
underlying sales contract. The threat of non-payment coerces the beneficiary to
substantively perform the underlying sales contract. Thus, strict compliance assists in
economizing the costs of monitoring compliance under the “bilateral assurance”
mechanism.
The strict compliance standard plays an essential role where the information allows
the seller to conclude that the buyer will not waive minor discrepancies. In such
circumstances, the seller retains the ability to present documentation that strictly
conforms to the terms and conditions of the letter of credit.

Submitting documents that

strictly comply with the terms and conditions entitle the beneficiary to absolute payment
from the issuing bank. Accordingly, the “bilateral assurance” mechanism incorporates
this particular aspect of the traditional explanation of why letters of credit are selected by
commercial parties.
a. The Reasonable Document Checker Standard: A Practical Approach
to Letter o f Credit Compliance
Judicial scrutiny has largely failed to satisfy the needs of the letter of credit
community. As has been discussed in Chapter Three, courts throughout the United States
have occasionally interpreted strict compliance to mean a literal mirror-image
requirement. Such an interpretation requires that the documents must exactly conform to
the letter of credit requirements. Such a rigid approach, however, fails to take into
consideration the commercial parties’ motives, expectations, and reasoning for accepting53
533 Ibid.

125

or rejecting a document that merely has a typographical error. The shortcoming of the
courts has been their inability to give deference to reasonable banking standards. This
section addresses which particular interpretation of the strict compliance standard serves
the best interests of sophisticated commercial parties under the “bilateral assurance”
mechanism.
The failure of the UCP 500 to clearly state a standard of compliance has resulted in
different interpretation of the standards of compliance by American courts. Recognizing
the uncertainty and confusion that emerged, the drafters of the UCP 600 sought to
remedy the situation by revamping the law. Lisa Pietrzak argues that the UCP 600 rejects
the mirror-image strict compliance standard and supports compliance under a “rational
link” test as adopted by the District Court for the Southern District of Texas in VoestAlpine.534
The UCP adopts the position of Voest-Alpine, which means that it takes a case-by
case approach, permitting minor deviations. This approach allows the banks to read the
data in a document in the context of the letter of credit. Moreover, the UCP expressly
refutes the claims that a document need to be exactly identical to all other information in
that document, any other required document, or the credit. What has emerged under the
UCP 600 is a “rational” test which looks to whether the entire documents relate to the
transaction on their face and whether the documents bear obvious links.
By removing the strict compliance requirement, the UCP 600 and Voest-Alpine
essentially bars courts from imposing their own judicial determination of a “material”
discrepancy and replaces it with a reasonable document checker standard. Under this

5,4 Lisa Pietrzak, “Sloping in the Right Direction: A First Look at the UCP 600 and the New Standards as
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standard, if a bank determines the discrepancy to be material, the court upholds the
bank’s decision so long as international banking standards imply the same. Courts will
reject a decision, however, if international banking standards do not support the bank’s
decision.
This thesis rejects the application of the mirror-image interpretation of strict
compliance as manifested by cases such as Beyene and Hanil. Instead, it proposes the
adoption of rational strict compliance standard based upon the principle of a reasonable
document checker and banking judgment. The degree of flexibility in this particular
standard is less than absolute compliance, but substantially greater than non-compliance.
This particular standard recognizes that in general, judges are not banking experts nor
qualified to make decisions regarding the banking standard for which a document checker
will accept or reject documents presented to it under a letter of credit.535 In applying the
banking judgment rule in a letter of credit transaction, courts should assume that when a
bank makes a decision whether to honor or reject a presentation, the document checker
has acted in good faith, on an informed basis, and that the documents were in compliance
with the letter of credit.

In the absence of an abuse of discretion, courts should not

interfere with the decision made by the document checker in its decision to honor or
reject the payment under the letter of credit.537
To protect issuing banks from potential litigation arising from upset beneficiaries,
Pietrzak argues that even in cases where the bank makes the wrong decision with regards
to payment, the issuing bank should not be held liable so long as the court determines that
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the process employed by the bank is rational and completed with good faith.538
Accordingly, the burden should be on the party challenging the decision to establish facts
to rebut the presumption that the document checker acted under such a banking standard
judgment. By shifting the burden to the challenging party, banks’ fear of litigation and
the high rate of discrepancies may be curtailed. Furthermore, employing the proposed
standard will provide uniformity in letter of credit transactions.539
The Voest-Alpine test is a practical approach that incorporates the practices of
commercial parties in the letter of credit regime. Specifically, it comports to the “bilateral
assurance” rationale because it allows payment for the minor technical mistakes Mann
and Sakchutchawam’s research identifies. Under a more rigid strict compliance standard,
the beneficiary would not be entitled to payment. Further, as Mann’s study shows, the
majority of discrepancies could not be attributed to an oppressive interpretation of the
terms stated in the letter of credit. Accordingly, the proposed strict compliance standard
continues to provide the beneficiary with the incentive to substantively perform the
underlying contract.
VI. Equitable Remedies Under the “Bilateral Assurance” Mechanism: GoodFaith and Estoppel
The potential oppressive nature of the application of the mirror-image strict
compliance standard, as well the discretion issuing banks maintain regarding waivers, has
led some commentators to lobby for equitable remedies to protect beneficiaries from
potential abuse. Among the most common equitable remedies in the literature are good-
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faith and estoppel. These two remedies, firmly entrenched in contract law, are
occasionally applied in the letter of credit context in an attempt to ensure fair results.
This section is dedicated to investigating the different rationales of good-faith and
estoppel within the letters of credit regime. The equitable remedies are then addressed
within the context of the “bilateral assurance” mechanism,
a. Good-Faith and Letters o f Credit
Professor Mann’s research implies that the beneficiary is entitled to payment when
three things occur: (1) the beneficiary performs, (2) the applicant acts in good faith and
waives the discrepancies, and (3) the issuing bank accepts the applicant’s waiver and
pays the letter of credit.540 The disconnect between the beneficiary’s underlying
performance of the sales contract and its right to be paid under the letter of credit creates
the possibility for opportunistic conduct. Opportunistic conduct refers to actions by
parties that attempt to frustrate the beneficiary’s reasonable expectation of payment by
taking advantage of the strict letter of credit rules to deny payment to a beneficiary who
has fully performed its obligations in the underlying sales contract, but who has presented
documents that although are less than perfect, would have been accepted but for the
applicant’s insolvency.541
A letter of credit may fail when a buyer becomes insolvent and the issuing bank
subsequently may not permit waivers of minor discrepancies. Ultimately, such practice
results in the beneficiary not being paid even though it may have performed the
underlying sales contract. Such opportunistic behavior may surprise a seller who has
performed exactly as they have in previous transactions with the same bank and buyer,

540 Moses, supra note ( 15 ) at 39.
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and where they had been paid. Consequently, the beneficiary may end up losing
significant money.
In Bombay Indus, Inc v Bank o f NY the underlying issue was under the letter of credit,
who would bear the loss of the buyer’s financial insolvency—the issuing bank or the ■
beneficiary.542 The underlying sales contract was between Bombay Industries and
Collection Clothing for the purchase of shorts and shirts. Bombay Industries had
imported the clothing to New Jersey and then trucked them to a warehouse in New York
where the goods were separated. Collection Clothing accepted the goods with no
complaints.543
When Bombay Industries submitted the documents to the issuing bank for payment,
the issuing bank noted two discrepancies. First, the letter of credit required that the bill of
lading show that the goods were delivered from a New Jersey port, but the actual bill of
lading showed goods delivered from New York. Second, a fax submitted by Bombay
Industries notifying an individual with the shipping details did not include the actual fax
number.544*After being notified of the discrepancies, Bombay Industries was shortly
afterwards notified that Collection Clothing had waived them. Approximately two weeks
after presenting the documents, Bombay Industries learned from Collection Clothing that
Collection Clothing owed the issuing bank $6.8 million and that Collection Clothing and
the bank were in the process of renegotiating the debt. When the negotiations broke

542 Bombay Indus, Inc v Bank o f NY, (Bombay I) No 103064/95, 9817, 1995 WL 808811 at 1 (NY Sup Ct
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down, the bank refused to honor the presentation and forced Collection Clothing to go
into bankruptcy. It subsequently took possession of the goods.545
The court granted summary judgment in favor of the seller, stating that though the
issuing bank ordinarily has the rights to demand strict compliance with the conditions of
the letter of credit, the issuing bank based its decision not to waive the discrepancies “on
factors outside the operative documents and contractual arrangements.”546 Further, the
court found that the issuing bank breached an implied covenant of good faith by not
paying for goods delivered which enabled the bank to apply the value of the goods to its
secured debt. Moreover, the court found the issuing bank to have acted in bad faith
because it had previously waived the same discrepancy between the same parties. Finally,
the court noted that when a seller delivers goods to a buyer in reliance on payment under
a letter of credit, the seller must be assured that issuing bank will act in a neutral
manner. 547
The case was appealed and summary judgment was reversed.*548 When tried again, the
court found in favor of Bombay Industries once more. The court’s rationale, however,
was based upon the failure of the issuing bank to give the seller the required seven day
notice that it was rejecting the documents as required under the UCP.54950The court
narrowed its definition of bad faith. It found that the bank breached its duty of good faith
by “conceal[ing] its intention to dishonor the letter of credit from Bombay.”530 The court
thus disregarded the previous court’s rationale on requirement that the issuing bank be
545
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neutral and that the issuing bank had previously waived the same discrepancy between
the same commercial parties.

-

The incentive for banks to engage in opportunistic conduct in letter of credit
transactions occurs when the issuing bank learns that the applicant is insolvent and
cannot reimburse it. The issuing bank is motivated to review the documents submitted by
the beneficiary in a mirror-image fashion and put forth any discrepancies it may find. In
some circumstances, even where the applicant has waived the discrepancies, the issuing
bank may refuse payment to the beneficiary.551 Thus, if the bank fails to appropriately
screen and monitor the applicant’s creditworthiness, and the applicant is insolvent, then
the issuing bank will attempt to shift the loss to the beneficiary. The beneficiary, in turn,
will be exposed to the loss that it initially sought to avoid through the use of the letter of
credit.552*
The UCP is silent on the issue of good faith and has left the matter to domestic law.
In the United States, Revised Article 5 provides that “[g]ood faith [in this article] means
honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.”533 This standard is considered to
be narrow and subjective. Courts have interpreted it to mean that so long as the party has
acted honestly, according to its belief and knowledge, its conduct will not be measured
against a more objective community standard of fair dealing.554
The narrow definition of good faith adopted by Revised Article 5 looks at the party’s
state of mind. Courts have applied it by determining: if the person acted honestly,
without improper motive (pure heart); then the fact that the party’s actions were negligent
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or foolish (empty headed) would not indicate bad faith.533 This honesty-in-fact test has
traditionally been applied in the purchase of negotiable instruments or the transfer of title
to goods, with the objective of facilitating the circulation of commercial paper and
goods.536 The good-faith performance, the broader test, takes an objective approach ties
to commercial reasonableness.
Two of the issuing bank’s obligations are particularly relevant when determining
whether an issuing bank has acted in good faith when it dishonors a letter of credit
because of the buyer’s financial insolvency.557 First, issuing banks are required to observe
the standard practices of financial institutions that regularly engage in letter of credit
transactions and second, they must pay against conforming documents.558
Many of the standard practices of financial institutions are found in the UCP.559 Aside
from the UCP, there are other non-controversial practices that financial institutions
engage in. Among the most common of these practices is screening the applicant’s
creditworthiness.560 Further, the independence principle, which is recognized by both
Revised Article 5 and the UCP, maintains that banks deal solely with documents.561 This
implies that the issuing bank does not determine compliance based upon its self-interest,
but rather solely on whether the documents comply on their face.
The second requirement—issuing bank’s paying against complying documents—is
absolutely critical in the sense that the seller has a reasonable expectation of being paid
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when it performs the underlying sales contract.562563The seller generally acquiesces to the
letter of credit because it is a secure, prompt, and efficient payment mechanism. Thus, the
seller selects the letter of credit because its protection against the buyer’s insolvency.
It has been argued by Margaret Moses that when the buyer is insolvent and the
issuing bank refuses payment because of the applicant’s insolvency courts should
• •
• •
scrutinize such activity.
b. Estoppel and Letters o f Credit
The second protection against the abuse of oppressive strict compliance is provided
by the courts and is meant to protect against bad faith and unconscionable conduct. This
protection is known as estoppel.564 Interestingly, those courts that have applied a
substantial compliance standard have been those most willing to implement an estoppel
rule. Courts have applied two forms of estoppel in the context of letters of credit.565 The
prevailing rule requires that the beneficiary show that by failing to specify the objections
timely, the issuing bank induced detrimental reliance in the beneficiary so that it failed to
cure the defect before expiration.566 This is the classic estoppel rule which sometimes
allows for the beneficiary to prevail. When a bank receives documents, it is required to
act promptly. The UCC requires bank to act within three days. Failure to do so constitutes
dishonor.567 Under the general rule, any bank that fails to specify defects within the three
day time limit will be stopped from raising such a defect as a defense when the
beneficiary sues, so long as the beneficiary can show detrimental reliance.568
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The second rule of estoppel gets rid of the detrimental reliance requirement and the
bank is bound by the objections it raises promptly.569 Accordingly, a bank cannot raise
objections after the fact, and if it specifies no objections within the three banking days,
the UCC gives it to examine the documents, then it cannot argue that the documents were
defective.570
VII.

The Role of Issuing Banks Under with the “Bilateral Assurance”
Mechanism

For the “bilateral assurance mechanism” to function as described above, the seller
must be provided with the assurance that it will be paid if it substantively performs the
underlying sales contract.571*This necessitates that the buyer will not take advantage of
discrepancies as an excuse not to honor. If the seller lacks this assurance, it will be
obliged to ensure that its documentation strictly complies with the terms and conditions
of the letter of credit to protect itself from the potential of opportunistic conduct by the
buyer.

The issuing bank plays a fundamental role in this account of how letters of

credit function. Specifically, the issuing bank has to monitor and supervise the buyer in
order to ensure that the buyer does not act opportunistically in those circumstances where
the seller substantively performs the underlying contract.573
Under the “bilateral assurance” mechanism the issuing bank’s role is more clearly
defined.574 It provides the issuing bank with additional incentives to perform its task of
monitoring the buyer.575 Mann’s account focused on the issuing bank’s incentives in
569
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terms of its reputation—if a buyer does not pay, future sellers will not deal with the
issuing bank. In the alternative account proposed in this thesis, the bank maintains it
reputational incentive but also possesses a legal incentive.57657This legal incentive
manifests itself in that the seller always has the ability to submit conforming
documents.

In most circumstances the seller does not want to exercise this option

because of the high cost and the knowledge that it can obtain payment without going
through such expense. If, however, the seller receives knowledge that the buyer is acting
in bad faith through informal channels, then it takes greater effort in presenting
documents that conform. The threat that the seller may present conforming documents
means that the bank is legally obliged to pay and provides the issuing bank with an
incentive to monitor the buyer for substantive compliance ex post, as well as screen the
buyer ex ante.578
VIII. Why Applicants Waive Discrepancies
The “bilateral assurance” mechanism demonstrates that the letter of credit is a
document that is not enforced by sophisticated commercial parties in most instances.
Interestingly, the manner by which waivers operate in the letter of credit setting
exemplifies its role in contractual relations and contract law.579 Lisa Bernstein has argued
that commercial parties routinely place strict legal conditions in their agreements
knowing that they will be waived. The legal conditions are placed because the threat of
the conditions helps economize the costs of the contract enforcement.580 According to
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Bernstein, the conditions are not meant to define the commercial parties’ rights and duties
in the context of a successful ongoing relationship. Rather, the terms and conditions are
“endgame” norms that are meant to be invoked in those circumstances where the
relationship breaks down.581 Similarly, Robert Scott has argued that in the context of
debtor-creditor contracts coercive measures such as repossession and acceleration clauses
are best understood as formal threats that are meant to economize the monitoring and
enforcement costs of the debtor’s obligations. In most cases, these coercive measures are
not intended to be carried out.582
An essential part of these scholar’s arguments are that such formal conditions must be
maintained as part of the legally enforceable obligation.583*According to their accounts,
doctrines such as good faith and estoppel reduce the threat of force of the formal
CO A

conditions.

Interestingly however, in the United States the enforceability of such

formal legal conditions has been eroding over the past few decades.585
The terms and conditions of a letter of credit are analogous to the various contracts
discussed above. Sakchutchawam’s research shows that approximately 49 percent of
discrepancies can be attributed to applicant’s imposition of excessive terms and
conditions in the letter of credit. The applicant places excessive terms and conditions in
the letter of credit as a means to ensure that the beneficiary will substantively perform the
underlying sales contract. Mann demonstrates that in most circumstances, the applicant
will not insist on strict compliance with the majority of the terms and conditions and
waive the discrepancies. The terms and conditions are meant to economize the costs of
581
582
583
584
585

Ibid at 766.
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enforcement by providing the applicant with the ability of legally enforcing them in those
situations where the signals indicate the failure of the beneficiary to substantively
conform to the underlying sales contract.
The model described above explains why commercial parties select to use letters of
credit, why they impose conditions that are stricter than they plan on enforcing, why the
overwhelming majority of letters of credit are paid although they do not conform, and
why they are priced in proportion to their face value. The commercial parties select the
letter of credit, as opposed to alternative instruments, because they motivate the seller and
buyer to perform substantively.586 Stricter conditions than they actually intend on
enforcing are placed in the letter so that the costs of formal compliance, combined with
the ability of the buyer to refuse payment when the formal conditions are not met,
reinforce the seller’s incentive to perform substantively.587 As the empirical data
suggests, most letters of credit are paid because the majority of the underlying sales
contract are performed according to the buyer’s expectation.
This explanation falls squarely within Mann’s empirical data. There is no indication
in his data revealing that that the discrepancies can be attributed to a substantive
contractual breach, the buyer is not willing to waive.588589Almost 60 percent of the defects
he identifies concerns technical defects that have little to do with the underlying bargain
and of the 28 percent that he classifies as substantive, over half consists of late or short
shipment, which in some cases may not necessarily be a breach from either a legal or
practical standpoint.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Buyers and sellers are subject to various risks in international business transactions.
The buyer is primarily concerned with the substantive performance of the underlying
sales contract. Meanwhile, the seller is interested in obtaining prompt payment. To
mitigate these potential risks, commercial parties may select from a wide spectrum of
financial arrangements. On one side of the spectrum is the prepayment option which
requires the buyer to pay prior to production and shipment of the goods. On the other side
is the open account arrangement whereby the seller produces and ships the goods and
then awaits for payment. Both arrangements, however, fail to provide an intermediate
solution that mitigates the risks both parties encounter in an international business
transaction.
The commercial letter of credit provides parties with an intermediate solution. Its
popularity stems from its ability to allow unfamiliar buyers and sellers located in
different countries, to engage in a secure, efficient, and inexpensive method of payment.
The letter of credit contains various terms and conditions which the seller-beneficiary
must fulfill to ensure payment. Generally, the letter of credit requires the beneficiary to
submit a bill of lading, commercial invoice, insurance certificate, certificate of origin, and
other documentation.
Studies cited in Chapters One and Two demonstrate that beneficiaries fail to submit
conforming documentation in the majority of letter of credit transactions. This implies
that the overwhelmingly majority of beneficiaries are not entitled to payment. In
particular, the UCP 600 recognizes that discrepancies, in initial presentations by
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beneficiaries, are as high as 70 percent. Moreover, Ronald Mann’s empirical study
demonstrates the discrepancy rate to be as high as 73 percent. The findings in these
studies run counter to the traditional assured-payment explanation which emphasizes the
role of conforming documentation. Accordingly, Hypothesis 1—commercial parties pay
substantial fees for letters of credit to finance their business transactions because the
letter of credit provides the seller-beneficiary with an assured-payment mechanism—is
rejected.
Mann’s empirical study demonstrates that buyers waive the discrepancies in nearly all
of the transactions. His findings led him to answer the fundamental question posed in his
research by arguing that letters of credit provide an alternative service for the
beneficiary—verifying the financial solvency of the applicant. The “verification” service
primarily relies upon reputational sanctions. That is, if an issuing bank refuses to pay the
beneficiary, then future beneficiaries will refrain from engaging in future transactions
with the issuing bank.
Mann’s “verification” explanation, however, fails to adequately answer the question
proposed in his research. Specifically, it fails to consider the applicant’s need to verify
the substantive performance of the underlying sales contract and the ability of the
applicant and beneficiary to legally enforce the letter of credit when the relationship
between the two parties deteriorates and collapses. To ensure performance, the applicant
places strict terms and conditions in the letter of credit as a mean to economize the costs
of enforcement.
Informational signaling, through the preparation of the documentation discussed in
Chapter Four, provides the applicant with the necessary information to determine whether
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the beneficiary has fulfilled its obligations. In most instances, the applicant does not need
to strictly enforce the terms and conditions in the letter of credit because the
discrepancies are not related to the substantive provisions of the contract. Therefore,
Hypothesis 2—commercial parties select letters of credit because of “verification”
service it provides to the seller-beneficiary—is rejected.
The letter of credit operates as a “bilateral enforcement” mechanism which in most
circumstances does not need to be used. This approach emphasizes that the primary
objective of the buyer is to obtain goods that conform to the quality, quantity, and
description agreed to in the underlying sales contract. The seller, on the other hand,
ultimately seeks payment for the goods it produces and ships. Accordingly, this theory
stresses that the commercial parties are not interested in the documents per se, but rather,
the completion of their agreement.
Commercial parties use informational signals to indicate whether they have
performed their obligations. Specifically, the “bilateral assurance” mechanism makes use
of “soft information”—communication prior to the conclusion of the underlying sales
contract—which allows the parties to modify their behavior. Further, the completion of
concrete actions—the preparation of the bill of lading, commercial invoice, packing list,
insurance certificate, and certificate of country of origin—by the beneficiary signals to
the applicant that it has substantively performed the underlying contract. These
documents possess the information regarding the goods that allow the applicant to
determine whether the beneficiary has substantively complied. More importantly, these
documents can be legally enforced in court. When the informal channels signal a breach
by either of the commercial parties, then the letter of credit operates in its traditional legal
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manner; that is, the applicant can insist upon strict compliance with the terms and
conditions or the beneficiary can prepare documents that strictly conform. Consequently,
the Alternative Hypothesis is not rejected.
Strict compliance plays a fundamental role in the “bilateral assurance” mechanism. It
serves as a measure that economizes the costs of contract enforcement. Thus, strict
enforcement of the terms and conditions provides the seller with the incentives to
perform; however, it does not define the relationship between commercial parties who
maintain a successful commercial relationship. This explains the widespread practice of
applicants waiving discrepancies in Mann’s study. Strict compliance is only applied in
those situations whereby the relationship between the two commercial parties is broken
down.
The fundamental role of strict compliance under the letter of credit regime implies
that equitable remedies, favored by many advocates of the substantial compliance
standard, do not play a role in the “bilateral assurance” mechanism. Subjecting issuing
banks or applicants to good-faith requirement and estoppels reduces the beneficiary’s
incentives to strictly comply with the letter of credit.
Finally, in order for the “bilateral assurance” mechanism to function properly, the
seller must be assured that the buyer will not seize upon minor discrepancies and decline
payment. The issuing bank supervises and ensures that the buyer does not act
opportunistically because it possesses both a reputational incentive and legal obligation.
The research reported in this thesis utilizes Mann’s empirical study which collected
500 letters of credit transactions from five banks in the late 1990s. Mann’s study was
selected in this research because it continues to remain the leading empirical work in the
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field. In the absence of more recent empirical data, the author suggests that data should
be collected from letter of credit transactions from 2000 to the present. When available,
such data should be subjected to the systematic methodology outlined in this thesis to
further test the validity of the conclusions of this thesis. In particular, the author also
recommends considering potential impacts due to the current global recession. Such an
examination may provide a clearer picture as to the practices of sophisticated commercial
parties during difficult economic times. Further, the data collected should distinguish
between commercial parties who interact for the first time versus commercial parties who
have an ongoing commercial relationship in order to test whether commercial parties
behave in a similar matter when they have a prior business relationship.
Finally, future research should be conducted in a multi-disciplinary approach.
Professionals from various fields, including, but not limited to, lawyers, statisticians,
finance, bankers, export-import, and other professions from both the private and public
sectors should be involved to gather data and subject it to rigorous statistical testing.
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